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MONEY THAT COSTS TOO MUCH:
REGULATING FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
KRISTEN UNDERHILL
 Money may not corrupt. But should we worry if it corrodes? Legal scholars in a 
range of fields have expressed concern about “motivational crowding-out,” a 
process by which offering financial rewards for good behavior may undermine 
laudable social motivations, like professionalism or civic duty. Disquiet about the 
motivational impacts of incentives has now extended to health law, employment law, 
tax, torts, contracts, criminal law, property, and beyond. In some cases, the fear of 
crowding-out has inspired concrete opposition to innovative policies that marshal 
incentives to change individual behavior. But to date, our fears about crowding-out 
have been unfocused and amorphous; our field lacks the language we need to speak 
precisely about these behavioral phenomena, and we have not examined when and 
why motivational crowding-out should prompt us to discontinue or temper incentive-
based schemes. Without a clear and nuanced picture of the processes, harms, and 
benefits of crowding-out, we may well be missing the mark. 
This Article canvasses the range of legal areas where crowding-out concerns 
arise, and it newly illuminates the specific harms that may be attributable to 
crowding-out effects. These hazards include reduced autonomy in the presence of 
incentives, a distinct set of behavioral inefficiencies, and the potential degradation 
of individual or social values. But this Article also challenges the view of crowding-
out as uniformly harmful, offering an alternative vision of potential crowding-out 
benefits, such as crowding out invidious motivations, increasing the predictability of 
agent activity, and bolstering the efficiency of future incentives. These benefits 
suggest that the precautionary principle, which would counsel against using 
incentives where crowding-out is possible—is inappropriate for this field.  
The Article also proposes a novel taxonomy to help guide regulatory responses to 
incentives that cause crowding-out. Different categories of incentives present 
different justifications for regulatory intervention and redesign, including autonomy 
concerns, efficiency concerns, and negative externalities imposed on third parties. 
By organizing incentives based on the relationship between the principal and agent, 
we can identify opportunities for regulators and incentive architects to redesign or 
limit incentive programs, to leave incentives in place, or to consider discontinuing 
incentive-based policies when money indeed “costs too much” in motivation.
                                                                                                                
 Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. JD, Yale Law School (2011); DPhil, 
University of Oxford (2007). I am grateful to Ian Ayres, Amy Kapczynski, Bill Sage, 
participants in the Petrie-Flom 2014 Annual Conference, and attendees at the American 
Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics Health Law Professors Conference for feedback and 
formative discussions about incentives and motivation. All errors herein are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION
Motivations matter in the law. To cite a few examples, motivations have long 
been crucial elements of tests in employment law, criminal law, legislative 
interpretation, disparate treatment law, and other areas. Now, in a theme cutting 
across disciplines, many legal scholars have expressed concern about “intrinsic” and 
“extrinsic” motivations, their relative balance, and the potential for extrinsic carrots 
and sticks to disrupt laudable values.1 Echoing empirical research in psychology and 
economics, this thread of scholarship most frequently uses the term “motivational 
crowding-out” to describe a central problem: when an individual encounters an 
extrinsic incentive (e.g., a payment or fine) to encourage good behavior, the incentive 
may displace or erode her intrinsic motivation for good choices.2 This hidden “cost 
of price”3 can cause incentives to be inefficient or even backfire entirely—indeed, 
under these conditions, money may “cost too much.”4 The law relies heavily on 
incentives; to take just a few examples, we depend on financial motivations in 
workplace wellness programs, incentives for recycling or public transit use, rewards 
or fines to motivate voting, and even entire common-law systems such as tort liability 
for negligent behavior. If money corrodes motivations such as self-care, 
environmental morale, civic duty, professionalism, or altruism, scholars are right to 
question whether such programs have reckoned sufficiently with their motivational 
impacts.  
                                                                                                                
1. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, 
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 
616–24 (2014); Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 1151, 1178–79 (2010); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, 
Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 83, 98–100 (1978); Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer 
Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 
203–04 (2013); Lynn A. Stout, Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences 
of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J. CORP. L. 525, 552–53 (2014). 
2. See Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polanía-Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social 
Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 368 (2012) (surveying 
the literature on crowding-out). 
3. Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical 
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746 (1997). 
4. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Wealth, in THE CONDUCT OF LIFE (1860). 
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Given the pervasive uses of incentives throughout the law, commentators have 
voiced concerns about crowding-out in a range of domains, including health law, 
environmental law, employment law, torts, contracts, property, tax, and criminal law. 
These concerns are most frequently speculative, given the paucity of field studies 
investigating crowding-out in connection with specific legal policies. But there is a 
robust body of crowding-out scholarship outside the law, and our field’s engagement 
with crowding-out is often superficial. To evaluate claims about crowding-out, we 
need a more complete accounting of how this phenomenon may manifest in the law, 
and a framework for bringing the field’s many claims into dialogue. I begin this 
Article by offering the first attempt to consolidate the many areas in which crowding-
out has aroused concern in the law, canvassing judicial decisions, legislative history, 
and legal scholarship.  
My second goal in this Article is to move beyond the jumble of legal scholars’ 
crowding-out concerns to offer a precise overview of the harms and benefits that may 
flow from motivational crowding-out. I have previously evaluated the complex and 
heterogeneous causes of crowding-out.5 This paper will shift its focus to the 
heterogeneous effects that crowding-out may generate. To date, discussions about the 
harms attributable to crowding-out have been confused. Legal scholars tend to define 
crowding-out as occasions when incentive programs backfire entirely, crowding out 
intrinsic motivation so completely that good behavior declines compared to baseline 
levels.6 But crowding-out can have many other, more subtle effects that legal 
scholars have overlooked. Incentive programs may improve behavior even when 
crowding-out occurs, but they may also affect performance quality, sustainability of 
performance over time, distribution of tasks across a population, and engagement in 
nonincentivized behaviors that rely on similar motivations.  
This Article is the first to offer a cross-cutting view of the diverse impacts of 
crowding-out in response to incentive-based policies, illuminating not only the 
immediate effects of incentives on behavioral engagement, but also considering 
performance quality, choking, distraction, gaming, agent selection effects (i.e., 
changes in the population of agents who engage in a desirable behavior), effects on 
competition among agents, and spillovers to other behaviors. I then expand this 
discussion beyond instrumental effects to consider impacts on autonomy and 
individual or societal values. Understanding the full range of crowding-out effects is 
essential for measuring the occurrence and magnitude of this behavior as a response 
to incentives in the law; current scholarship has acknowledged only a few of these 
effects, which impoverishes our efforts to evaluate, endorse, or dismiss crowding-
out theory.  
In addition to my review of the harms caused by crowding-out, I take the novel 
step of proposing that crowding-out may also confer benefits. Incentives may, for 
                                                                                                                
5. See Kristen Underhill, Extrinsic Incentives, Intrinsic Motivation, and Motivational 
Crowding-Out in Health Law and Policy, in NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Lynch & Christopher Robertson eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter Underhill, Extrinsic Incentives]; Kristen Underhill, When Extrinsic Incentives 
Displace Intrinsic Motivation: Designing Legal Carrots and Sticks To Confront the Challenge 
of Motivational Crowding-Out, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 215 (2016) [hereinafter Underhill, When 
Extrinsic].
6. See, e.g., Feldman & Lobel, supra note 1, at 1180; Stout, supra note 1, at 552. 
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example, displace or erode invidious motivations, such as interpersonal biases that 
animate race-based or gender-based discrimination. Incentives that cause crowding-
out may make agent activity more predictable, thereby encouraging greater 
investment by principals. Crowding-out that reflects changed preferences for 
material gain may also make agents more sensitive to future incentives, thereby 
improving the efficacy of other incentive-based policies. I will consider these and 
other benefits in this Article, considering for the first time in legal scholarship that 
these effects may be desirable. 
Beyond offering a careful catalog of crowding-out effects, this Article has a third 
goal: to consider the normative question of when and why crowding-out should 
prompt the regulation, redesign, or discontinuation of incentive plans. There are 
many areas of law where federal statutes or regulations already structure the use of 
incentive plans by private principals, such as workplace wellness programs,7 pay-
for-performance in executive compensation,8 and payment for blood and organ 
donation.9 But it is unclear why motivational crowding-out would provide a 
persuasive normative basis for regulating the use of incentives. To answer this 
question, I first discuss failures in incentive architecture (the design of incentive 
plans), identifying several reasons why governmental and private principals may fail 
to design incentive plans optimally. I further move to reject the precautionary 
principle, which would bar all incentives with crowding-out effects, based in part on 
my suggestion that crowding-out may also confer benefits.  
Instead of calling for the proscription of incentives that cause crowding-out, I 
offer methods for determining when and why regulation may be justified. To guide 
efforts to intervene in incentive schemes, this Article proposes a new taxonomy of 
incentive plans based on the relationships between principals who offer incentives 
(governmental principals, private principals, and agents who self-incentivize), agents 
who are incentivized, and intended beneficiaries who receive the benefits of agents’ 
behavior (i.e., principals, agents themselves, or third parties). Organizing incentive 
plans in this way exposes different normative justifications for regulatory 
intervention in each category of incentive programs. I suggest, for example, that 
when incentives are offered by governments, regulation to redesign or eliminate 
these incentive programs would be justified to correct autonomy-related harms, 
behavioral inefficiencies, or negative externalities imposed on third-party 
beneficiaries. But when incentives are offered by private parties (e.g., pay-for-
performance for employees), regulation is only justified to correct autonomy-related 
harms or negative externalities; private principals may wish to redesign incentive 
schemes independently to correct behavioral inefficiencies, but this justification does 
not support regulatory intervention. When agents self-incentivize, such as through 
                                                                                                                
7. E.g., Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 
Fed. Reg. 33,157 (June 3, 2013); Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health 
Coverage in the Group Market: Final Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014 (2006). 
8. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 162(m) (West 2017) (disallowing public corporations from 
deducting annual compensation above $1 million for the CEO or top four highest compensated 
officers, if that compensation is not tied to performance goals); see also Stout, supra note 1,
at 533. 
9. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West 2017).  
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commitment contracting, even autonomy-related harms and negative externalities 
disappear as viable justifications for intervention. 
To defend these claims, this Article proceeds in several Parts. Part I defines 
crowding-out and shows how crowding-out concerns arise in judicial decisions, 
legislation and regulation, and legal scholarship. Part II catalogues the large set of 
behavioral, autonomy-related, and moral harms attributable to motivational 
crowding-out, each of which inspires opposition to incentive arrangements. In Part 
III, I offer theoretically appealing benefits of crowding-out, as distinct from the 
harms that typically dominate commentary on incentives. Part IV begins by 
discussing failures in incentive architecture, detailing why incentive architects may 
persist in using incentives that are inefficient, counterproductive, or burdensome for 
third parties. I then present my framework for classifying incentive programs, along 
with the normative bases for intervention in each category of incentives. This 
taxonomy clarifies which incentive programs may be permissible subjects of 
regulatory intervention and redesign due to impacts on autonomy, efficiency, and 
third parties. I conclude by considering options for modifying incentive-based 
policies that give rise to crowding-out harms. 
I. CROWDING-OUT CONCERNS IN LAW AND POLICY DESIGN
Motivational crowding-out matters wherever there are efforts to control agents by 
external intervention.10 As rewards and punishments are inescapably “the traditional 
tools of legal regimes,”11 concerns about crowding-out are similarly inevitable in the 
law. Many areas of law deal intimately with principal-agent or fiduciary 
relationships, including employment law, torts, health law, family law, education 
law, and self-regulation of the professions, all of which seek to align the interests of 
agents and principals (loosely defined). Private principals such as employers or 
charitable organizations have long used financial and other incentives to motivate 
agent behavior, and these programs are coming under increasing scrutiny for 
potential crowding-out effects. Recent scholarship has also noted the tendency of 
modern regulatory regimes to favor carrots over sticks for the population as a whole, 
including areas such as environmental, criminal, and tax law.12 Incentive-based 
policies such as subsidies, tax credits, and other inducements are often more 
appealing than conscription, prohibition, and command-and-control regulation.13  
Concerns about motivational crowding-out are recurring, but no one has yet 
canvassed this literature to understand how crowding-out is invoked. This Part will 
consider how judicial decisions, legislative and regulatory activity, and legal 
scholarship have engaged with the concept of motivational crowding-out. 
                                                                                                                
10. Bruno S. Frey, On the Relationship Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation,
15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 427, 430 (1997). 
11. Eric Fleisig-Greene, Law’s War with Conscience: The Psychological Limits of 
Enforcement, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1203, 1217 (2007).  
12. Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of 
Price Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 797 (2012). 
13. Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and the Decline of 
Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 343 (2013). 
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A. Motivational Crowding-Out Defined 
Before detailing the relevance of motivational crowding-out in the law, however, 
a foundational description of crowding-out will be useful. Crowding-out theory 
divides motivations into extrinsic and intrinsic; extrinsic motivation is the desire to 
obtain a reward or avoid a penalty associated with a task, while intrinsic motivations 
encompass most other reasons for behavior, including but not limited to altruism, 
civic duty, professionalism, and morality.14 Crowding-out occurs when the 
introduction of an extrinsic incentive (either a reward or penalty, including non-
financial incentives) displaces or erodes an intrinsic motivation for decisions. 
Research from behavioral economics and psychology has illuminated a number of 
different processes that cause crowding-out. I have elsewhere reviewed these in 
detail as signaling processes (i.e., incentives transmit negative information to the 
agent, or they impair the agent’s ability to signal good information to outside 
observers or themselves); impairment of self-determination; changes in preferences 
for money compared to other values over time; and “learned helplessness” effects.15  
I distinguish between two forms of crowding-out. Absolute crowding-out occurs 
when the use of incentives leads to an absolute reduction in the level of intrinsic 
motivation, compared to intrinsic motivation in the absence of an incentive.16 This 
reduction may be temporary or permanent, but it persists at least as long as the 
incentive is in place. Relative crowding-out occurs when the use of incentives makes 
extrinsic motivation the primary reason for behavior, such that agents will engage in 
the task regardless of whether intrinsic motivation is present. The two forms of 
crowding-out may co-occur; to use a classic example, offering incentives for organ 
donation might diminish altruism among potential living donors, but these agents 
may nonetheless donate out of a desire to obtain the incentive. Alternately, each form 
of crowding-out may occur separately; for example, incentives may not lead to an 
absolute reduction in altruistic reasons for donating, but large incentives may mean 
that donors are now acting primarily to obtain the rewards, rather than primarily out 
of the desire to help others.17 Concerns about crowding-out in the law are primarily 
focused on absolute crowding-out, where incentives may potentially impoverish 
other motives for good behavior. 
B. Judicial Decisions  
Judicial decisions have grappled with the problem of motivational crowding-out 
in several contexts, including Good Samaritan activity, payment for criminal 
informants, and legislation criminalizing payment for blood marrow donation. For 
example, a Seventh Circuit decision in 2003 considered the absence of a common-
law obligation to assist strangers as a Good Samaritan; the court reviewed several 
justifications for this gap, including the idea that “liability might actually reduce the 
                                                                                                                
14. Underhill, When Intrinsic, supra note 5, at 222–23.
15. Id. at 235–54.
16. I previously introduced this distinction in Underhill, When Extrinsic, supra note 5. 
17. This distinction will be most useful in Part II.  
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number of altruistic rescues by depriving people of credit for altruism (how would 
they prove they hadn’t acted under threat of legal liability?).”18  
A long series of judicial decisions has also discussed the practice of offering 
informants benefits, typically consisting of sentence reductions or dropped charges, 
in exchange for information about criminal activity.19 Defendants in these cases often 
challenge incentivized informants’ motivations, on the assumption that information 
provided in anticipation of a benefit is less credible than information provided for 
altruistic reasons.20 The testimony of incentivized informants, however, is typically 
permissible with disclosure of the incentive arrangement,21 and courts have warned 
that the reliance on altruism alone is infeasible in this context.22
One Ninth Circuit case, Flynn v. Holder, has dealt more intensively with 
motivational crowding-out and its sequelae as a proffered rational basis for 
legislation.23 This case concerned the 1984 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 
part of which specified criminal penalties including fines and imprisonment for 
“acquir[ing], receiv[ing], or otherwise transfer[ring] any human organ for valuable 
consideration for use in human transplantation” in interstate commerce; “organs” 
were defined in such a way as to exclude blood, sperm, and eggs.24 The Flynn 
plaintiffs were individuals alleging present or future unmet needs for bone marrow 
transplants, as well as a nonprofit corporation that intended to operate a scholarship 
program that would award individual donors $3000 for bone marrow donations. The 
plaintiffs sought to permit payment for blood marrow donations provided through 
apheresis, a low-risk procedure requiring a course of medication followed by a blood 
withdrawal. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this process did not differ meaningfully 
from blood donation, thereby exempting it from NOTA’s prohibition on 
compensating donors.25  
                                                                                                                
18. Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2003). 
19. See, e.g., United States v. Hullaby, 736 F.3d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 2013) ((“[I]t is 
‘common practice for the government to reduce or drop charges against persons who cooperate 
with law enforcement officials in the prosecution of others’). We do not require the 
government to recruit solely informants who will work in a spirit of altruism for the good of 
mankind.”) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987)); United 
States v. Pomales-Lebron, 513 F.3d 262 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 
826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
20. See, e.g., Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 315 (“It is difficult to imagine a greater 
motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced sentence . . . .”). 
21. See, e.g., id. at 315–16; United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985); 
United States v. Pope, 330 F. Supp. 2d 948, 954–55 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (“[C]riminals are 
regularly the best source for information about criminal activity, and the test for probable cause 
is not the informant’s altruism but the reliability of his information.”). 
22. See, e.g., Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 537 (“To prohibit prosecutors from making promises 
in exchange for testimony works an ‘absurd’ result where crimes go unresolved because of 
worries about testimony that may be questionable, even though the system already has built-
in safeguards concerning questionable testimony by interested witnesses.”).
23. 684 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2012). 
24. 42 U.S.C.A § 274e (West 2011).  
25. Flynn, 684 F.3d at 862–65 (finding that a “blood marrow donation” through peripheral 
blood stem cell apheresis is simply a blood donation, and that NOTA clearly exempted the 
common practice of payment for blood donation). 
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Of greater interest for crowding-out, however, is the court’s analysis of NOTA’s 
ban on bone marrow donation through aspiration, a more invasive procedure that 
requires anesthesia and the withdrawal of marrow from donors’ hip bone cavities.
This process is not exempt from NOTA, and the Ninth Circuit found that, due in part 
to crowding-out fears, NOTA’s bar on compensation survived rational basis 
review.26 The government raised several crowding-out worries, including that 
“providing financial incentives would decrease the willingness of people to
voluntarily donate their organs and undermine the voluntary donor system . . . .”27
On the theory that incentives would replace altruism as the driving reason for 
donation, the government’s briefing further warned of downstream consequences, 
including undue inducements for poor people to donate, motivations for ineligible 
donors to provide inaccurate medical histories, and ultimately a degradation of the 
donation supply.28 The Ninth Circuit panel cited some of these concerns, suggesting 
a persuasive role for motivational crowding-out in rational basis review.29  
C. Legislation and Regulation 
As before, the most notable area in which both legislators and regulators have 
engaged with motivational crowding-out is again the case of organ and blood 
donation. The salience of motivational crowding-out in this context may be amplified 
due to early research on crowding-out related to blood donation in the 1970s; it is 
therefore unsurprising that lawmakers and administrators cite motivational 
crowding-out concerns directly as a basis for imposing legal rules. As described 
above, the 1984 NOTA firmly criminalized compensation for organ donation. This 
formalized a longstanding interpretation of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the 
NOTA’s predecessor previously adopted in all fifty states, to render the commercial 
transfer of organs illegal.30 Now in the wake of the Flynn decision, the exemption of 
blood marrow donation by apheresis may be short-lived. In October 2013, the 
Department of Health and Human Services published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking to include blood marrow donation by apheresis in its ban on 
compensating donors, noting the Congressional intent to “ban the commodification 
                                                                                                                
26. Id. at 859–62.
27. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss at 17, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (No. 2:09-cv-07772-VBF-AJW); accord Brief for Appellee at 12, Flynn v. Holder, 
684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-55643). 
28. See Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss at 25, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 
(9th Cir. 2012) (No. 2:09-cv-07772-VBF-AJW).  
29. Flynn, 684 F.3d at 859–62. For a fuller description of this case, see John A. Robertson, 
Paid Organ Donations and the Constitutionality of the National Organ Transplant Act, 40 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221 (2013); Recent Cases, Health Law—Organ Compensation—Ninth 
Circuit Holds that Compensation for Blood Stem Cell Transplant Procedure Does Not Violate 
National Organ Transplant Act—Flynn v. Holder, No. 10-55643, 2012 WL 1001300 (9th Cir. 
Mar. 27 2012)., 125 HARV. L. REV. 2201 (2012). 
30. Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss at 11, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (No. 2:09-cv-07772-VBF-AJW); accord Sara Krieger Kahan, Note, Incentivizing 
Organ Donation: A Proposal to End the Organ Shortage, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 757, 763 
(2009).  
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of [blood marrow cells] . . ., curb opportunities for coercion and exploitation, 
encourage altruistic donations, and decrease the likelihood of disease transmission 
resulting from paid donations.”31 Motivational crowding-out, along with its 
downstream effects, remains a primary concern animating this regulatory regime. 
Also in health law, concern about motivational crowding-out has influenced 
policy discussions over the structure of Medicare payments for physicians, including 
paying physicians based on quality of care.32 Such value-based payment (VBP) 
programs have drawn criticism based on their potential to crowd out providers’ 
intrinsic motivations to provide high-quality care, including professional norms and 
dedication to public service.33 Medicare had previously implemented an incentive-
based approach in its payments to hospitals under the Affordable Care Act, including 
Accountable Care Organization (ACO) demonstration projects and the Hospital 
Value-Based Purchasing Program.34 Despite the fear of crowding-out, value-based 
payment is now coming to individual physician payments as well as hospital 
payments under Medicare. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 
2015 provided for incentive-based payment for eligible health care providers, 
including rewards based on quality, resource use, improvements in practice, and use 
of electronic health records.35 Motivational crowding-out is a familiar objection to 
innovations in incentive pay, and evaluation of these new payment models will be 
instructive. 
D. Legal Scholarship 
Concerns about crowding-out effects are thriving in legal scholarship. Although 
a comprehensive review is not the purpose of this Article, a selection of legal areas 
that have considered crowding-out will illustrate the relevance of the phenomenon 
across the field. 
1. Health Law and Policy 
As the prior discussions of Flynn v. Holder and pay-for-performance may suggest, 
health law has been at the center of scholarship on motivational crowding-out effects. 
Compensation for blood and organ donation has long been a lightning rod.36
                                                                                                                
31. Change to the Definition of “Human Organ” under Section 301 of the National Organ 
Transplant Act of 1984, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,810, 60,812 (proposed Oct. 2, 2013) (codified in 42 
C.F.R. pt. 121).  
32. SGR: Date, Measures, and Models; Building a Future Medicare Physician Payment 
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Health of the Comm. on House Energy and 
Commerce, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Robert A. Berenson, Institute Fellow, Urban 
Institute).  
33. See id. at 124. 
34. See JULIA JAMES, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., HEALTH POLICY BRIEF:
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE (2012), https://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php? 
brief_id=78 [https://perma.cc/2Q2Z-SFX7].  
35. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 
(2012). 
36. See, e.g., DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL 
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Similarly, the issue of paying healthcare providers based on performance metrics has 
dogged health systems in a range of countries,37 and some have suggested that 
payment systems can “demoralize” individual physicians and healthcare 
institutions.38 These programs include incentives for overall performance quality as 
well as specific care practices such as medication prescription.39  
Recent years have also seen a rise in incentive programs managed by health 
insurers, by employers (i.e., wellness programs),40 and sometimes by individuals 
themselves (i.e., commitment contracts),41 which arrange financial incentives based 
on the achievement of health status goals or behaviors such as medication 
compliance.42 The use of extrinsic incentives to improve individual health behaviors 
has been particularly attractive in the United States, and current efforts often include 
financial rewards for health behaviors ranging from keeping doctors’ appointments 
to drug addiction treatment.43 One illustration of these programs with a governmental 
principal appears in Iowa’s Section 1115 demonstration waiver, which has organized 
its expansion of Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act.44 Under this waiver, 
enrollees with income above fifty percent of the federal poverty level must pay 
                                                                                                                
LIMITS OF MARKETS 192–95 (2010); WHEN ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR 
COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS (Sally Satel ed., 2009); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 
CALIF. L. REV. 543, 574–75 (2014) (describing crowding-out theory as applied to organ 
donation). 
37. See Frank Eijkenaar, Martin Emmert, Manfred Scheppach & Oliver Schöffski, Effects 
of Pay for Performance in Health Care: A Systematic Review of Systematic Reviews, 110 
HEALTH POL’Y 115, 116 (2013); see also Adam Oliver & Lawrence D. Brown, Incentivizing 
Professionals and Patients: A Consideration in the Context of the United Kingdom and the 
United States, 36 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 59 (2011). For additional empirical evidence on 
the effectiveness of pay-for-performance programs on improving healthcare quality, see 
Meredith B. Rosenthal & Richard G. Frank, What Is the Empirical Basis for Paying for Quality 
in Health Care?, 63 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 135 (2006) (finding mixed results).  
38. BARRY SCHWARTZ & KENNETH SHARPE, PRACTICAL WISDOM: THE RIGHT WAY TO DO
THE RIGHT THING 182–84, 199–211 (2010). This is of particular concern when the provider’s 
definition of “quality” care differs from the performance metric. Eijkenaar et al., supra note 
37, at 116.  
39. Pam Belluck, For Forgetful, Cash Helps the Medicine Go Down, N.Y. TIMES (June 
13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/health/14meds.html [https://perma.cc/3TCU 
-6JV2] (noting that “93,000 doctors are in Aetna’s ‘pay for performance’ program; bonuses 
average three percent to five percent of a practice’s base income.”).
40. Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle 
Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 198 (2008); Harald Schmidt, 
David A. Asch & Scott D. Halpern, Fairness and Wellness Incentives: What Is the Relevance 
of Process-Outcome Distinction?, 55 PREVENTIVE MED. S118 (2012). 
41. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, THE $500 DIET 17–35 (2010) [hereinafter, AYRES, THE $500
DIET] (describing the use of a commitment contract to lose weight in order to avoid forfeiting 
$500). 
42. Belluck, supra note 39. 
43. Oliver & Brown, supra note 37, at 78. 
44. Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Mikki Stier, 
Medicaid Dir., Iowa Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 16–19 (Oct. 27, 2017), 
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115 
/downloads/ia/ia-wellness-plan-ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/LML9-EGR4]. 
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premiums for Medicaid coverage and dental care, but these premiums will be waived 
based on the completion of annual risk assessments and preventive exam visits.45
Wellness programs of this nature, however, have inspired concern on the basis that 
they may crowd out individuals’ self-care motivations, leading to worse health 
behaviors after they are withdrawn.  
Crowding has also been a concern for governmental programs that provide 
publicly funded incentives—also called conditional cash transfer programs—for 
families to engage in welfare-promoting activities such as sending children to school, 
receiving vaccinations, or utilizing other health interventions.46 The use of 
conditional cash transfer programs is comparatively rare in the United States, but 
efforts have included New York’s Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards program to 
incentivize behaviors linked to improved health and reduced poverty, such as uptake 
and maintenance of health insurance and receipt of preventive dental care.47 Such 
programs have seen beneficial effects on behaviors such as education and clinic visits 
in other nations.48
Financial incentives for the conduct of human subjects research have also 
attracted attention in health law, including incentives for human subjects,49 and 
financial penalties for medical researchers who engage in unethical research 
activities.50
2. Environmental Law 
Like health law, environmental law has witnessed an increase in experimentation 
with financial incentives to motivate improvements in individual behavior. In 
                                                                                                                
45. Id. at 6.  
46. For a description, see Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier & Pedro Rey-Biel, When and Why 
Incentives (Don’t) Work To Modify Behavior, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 193 (2011) (citing Jere 
R. Behrman, Piyali Sengupta & Petra Todd, Progressing through PROGRESA: An Impact 
Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Rural Mexico, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL 
CHANGE 237 (2005)); see also Julio Frenk, Bridging the Divide: Global Lessons from 
Evidence-Based Health Policy in Mexico, 368 LANCET 954 (2006). 
47. JAMES A. RICCIO, NADINE DECHAUSAY, DAVID GREENBERG, CYNTHIA MILLER,
ZAWADI RUCKS & NANDITA VERMA, TOWARD REDUCED POVERTY ACROSS GENERATIONS:
EARLY FINDINGS FROM NEW YORK CITY’S CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM (2010), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786981 [https://perma.cc/6GYF-LS4Y]. 
48. See Mylene Lagarde, Andy Haines & Natasha Palmer, Conditional Cash Transfers
for Improving Uptake of Health Interventions in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A 
Systematic Review, 298 JAMA 1900 (2007); Oliver & Brown, supra note 37, at 79 (citing Saul 
S. Morris, Rafael Flores, Pedro Olinto & Juan Manuel Medina, Monetary Incentives in 
Primary Health Care and Effects on Use and Coverage of Preventive Healthcare Interventions 
in Rural Honduras: Cluster Randomised Trial, 364 LANCET 2030 (2004)); see also Gary 
Charness & Uri Gneezy, Incentives To Exercise, 77 ECONOMETRICA 909 (2009).  
49. See RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES
113 (2012); ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE WITH GOLD STARS, INCENTIVE 
PLANS, A’S, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES 86 (1999). 
50. See Yuval Feldman, Rebecca Gauthier & Troy Schuler, Curbing Misconduct in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: Insights from Behavioral Ethics and the Behavioral Approach to 
Law, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 620, 624 (2013). 
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environmental policy, crowding-out of environmentalist motivations has been 
predicted for tradeable emission rights, environmental taxes or emission charges, 
governmental subsidies, and restrictive regulations.51 Stephanie Stern has noted that 
motivational crowding-out may undermine governmental incentives for private 
landowners to engage in conservation activity.52 Some evidence suggests that social 
sanctions are more potent in this field than economic incentives; for example, people 
who are paid a small rebate for recycling bottles may be less willing to do so, 
compared to people in jurisdictions that do not pay rebates but where nonrecycling 
is a social error.53 Another environmental initiative that raised crowding-out concerns 
was the Spare the Air program in San Francisco, which provided free transit fares on 
days with poor air quality to reduce car pollution by commuters.54 An empirical 
evaluation of this program found that the free fares actually led to an increase in car 
trips, paradoxically transforming it into a “pay-for-pollution” incentive.55 Even when 
incentives are voluntary, such as when consumers voluntarily pay to offset their 
environmentally harmful behavior, the introduction of market pricing may 
nonetheless undermine intrinsic motivations to behave in an environmentally 
responsible way.56  
3. Employment Law and Executive Compensation 
Given the principal-agent problems that saturate employment law and the 
regulation of professions, discussion about motivational crowding-out is well 
developed in the field. Compensation for executive performance is among the most 
                                                                                                                
51. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, Environmental Morale and Motivation, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 412–22 (Alan 
Lewis ed., 2008); see also Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating 
Individual Behaviors That Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1114–26 (2012); Jason 
F. Shogren, WAEA Keynote Address Behavioral Environmental Economics: Money Pumps & 
Nudges, 37 J. AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. 349, 350–57 (2012).
52. See Stephanie Stern, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral 
Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 566–67, 567 n.156 (2006).  
53. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q.J. ECON. 791, 
805 (2000); see also Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May 
Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence from Economic Experiments, 320 SCI. 1605, 
1609 (2008); Sung-Ha Hwang & Samuel Bowles, Are Incentives Overused in Cases Where 
They Crowd Out Pro-social Motivations? 21 (Nov. 24, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.hec.unil.ch/documents/seminars/deep/358.pdf [https://perma.cc/436M-G2Y6] 
(citing Elisabeth Rosenthal, Motivated by a Tax, Irish Spurn Plastic Bags, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
2, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/02/world/europe/02bags.html [https://perma.cc/ 
78J2-A7DB]). 
54. See Steven E. Sexton, Paying for Pollution? How General Equilibrium Effects 
Undermine the “Spare the Air” Program, 53 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 553, 554 (2012).  
55. Id. at 573. The program also found large increases in discretionary (noncommuting) 
trips on free-transit days, and newspapers reported increases in passengers going to shopping 
and leisure destinations on these days. Id. This is consistent with crowding-out concerns about 
agent selection effects. See infra Section II.A.4.  
56. See Note, Uncommon Goods: On Environmental Virtues and Voluntary Carbon 
Offsets, 123 HARV. L. REV. 2065, 2073–75 (2010). 
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visible and studied categories of incentive, and many authors have considered 
whether incentive-based pay may impair employees’ moral preferences57 and other 
motivations to serve the firm.58 Other scholarship has considered the impact of 
performance-based pay for government agency administrators (including merit pay 
under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978),59 incentives for other public-sector 
employees,60 incentives for whistle-blowing behavior (including incentives under the 
Dodd-Frank Act),61 and penalties for self-interested behavior by governmental 
officials62—all on the theory that these extrinsic incentives and constraints may 
undermine other motivations for good behavior. Given empirical research suggesting 
that employees’ protection of trade secrets is largely motivated by concerns of 
morality and fairness, rather than penalties for trade secret disclosure,63 crowding-
out effects may be productively investigated in this area as well. Another intriguing 
focus of this scholarship has included whether financial incentives for firms to 
maintain ethics and compliance programs (as provided by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s Organizational Guidelines) may crowd out moral and social 
motivations for developing ethical firm cultures, and whether ethics programs 
                                                                                                                
57. See Stout, supra note 1; Barry Schwartz, The Dark Side of Incentives, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2009, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009 
-11-12/the-dark-side-of-incentives [https://perma.cc/5Y3P-LMHS] (arguing that incentives 
may “strip the moral dimension away from the people making big decisions”).
58. See Kelli A. Alces & Brian D. Galle, The False Promise of Risk-Reducing Incentive 
Pay: Evidence from Executive Pensions and Deferred Compensation, 38 J. CORP. L. 53, 79 
(2012); Nina Walton, Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation, 13 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 429, 442 (2012); Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social Reform of 
Banking, 39 J. CORP. L. 459, 474 (2014). 
59. See David A. Weisbach, Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and 
Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1823, 1847–49 (2006); see also KOHN, supra note 49, at 
125–26 (noting performance incentives for civil servants in federal agencies under the Civil 
Service Reform Act of 1978; evaluations found that the pay may not have affected 
organizational performance, and most managers surveyed believed that the financial 
incentives would not lead to increased effort). 
60. See Kirsten Bregn, Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public 
Sector? On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective, 13 PUB. ORG. REV. 21, 21–22 
(2013). 
61. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Whither Whistleblowing? Bounty Regimes, 
Regulatory Context, and the Challenge of Optimal Design, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 605, 
616 (2014); Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, Motivating Environmental Action in a Pluralistic 
Regulatory Environment: An Experimental Study of Framing, Crowding Out, and Institutional 
Effects in the Context of Recycling Policies, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 405, 411 (2012) (citing 
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of 
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151 
(2010)); Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower 
Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1235, 1275–
78 (2014); Emad H. Atiq, Note, Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out Effect of 
Legal Incentives, 123 YALE L.J. 1070, 1097–98 (2014). 
62. See Adrian Vermeule, Precautionary Principles in Constitutional Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 181, 207 (2012).  
63. See Yuval Feldman, The Expressive Function of Trade Secret Law: Legality, Cost, 
Intrinsic Motivation, and Consensus, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 177, 202–03 (2009). 
2018] MONEY THAT COSTS TOO MUCH 1123
themselves crowd out employees’ moral and social motivations for ethical 
behavior.64  
Also writing in employment law and corporations, Nina Walton has identified 
crowding-out as an explanation for rising executive compensation in the United 
States; if financial incentives crowd out an executive’s desire to act in the 
corporation’s benefit (e.g., preferences for reciprocity or fairness), the firm must 
increase the incentive to obtain a desirable level of executive effort.65 In subsequent 
years, “[p]rincipals will be willing to grant large incentive because they understand 
that the previous use of incentives has severely dampened feelings such as loyalty, 
fairness, and reciprocity.”66 The crowding-out effects of incentive pay are amplified, 
she suggests, by professional education that teaches future executives that “managers 
cannot be trusted unless they are given the appropriate incentives.”67 Walton has 
applied this reasoning to the special case of incentive pay in retention contracts for 
firms that were bailed out by the U.S. government during the financial crash, such as 
American International Group, Inc. (AIG); prior bonuses had already crowded out 
intrinsic concern for the firm, while retention bonuses implicitly acknowledged that 
crowding-out had already occurred and further undermined employees’ “sense of 
obligation to come to work without being paid a bonus.”68 Voluntary efforts to 
recover some bonus funds from employees were unsuccessful, leading to the 
suggestion that it may be impossible to recover intrinsic motivations that predated 
incentives.69
4. Torts 
The most salient discussion of crowding-out law in torts scholarship has centered 
on the worry that compensation, market rewards,70 or mandates71 for Good Samaritan 
behavior and salvage activities may crowd out altruism. The imprint of these 
crowding-out concerns may be seen in state Good Samaritan laws. Private citizens 
acting as Good Samaritans often receive immunity or benefit from a lower standard 
of care while attempting to rescue others (compared to the ordinary standard of care 
under the tort system);72 in some states, however, the acts of rescue must be 
demonstrably “gratuitous and without expectation of compensation” to qualify for 
                                                                                                                
64. See Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J.
CORP. L. 769, 822–25 (2014).  
65. Walton, supra note 58, at 430–31.
66. Id. at 431. 
67. Id. at 448. 
68. Id. at 350–51.
69. Id. at 454–55.
70. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, 
and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 98–100
(1978).  
71. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 71, 79 (2003).  
72. Victoria Sutton, Is There a Doctor (and a Lawyer) in the House? Why Our Good 
Samaritans Laws Are Doing More Harm Than Good for a National Public Health Security 
Strategy: A Fifty-State Survey, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 261, 282–88 (2010). 
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this immunity.73 Torts scholars have also suggested that the entire torts system for 
deterring harm to strangers may displace moral obligations to protect others.74  
5. Contracts 
In contract law, one modeling study has examined whether the specification of 
“complete” contracts and enforcement of contractual agreements may crowd out 
reciprocity motivations75 or trust in the marketplace.76 This has been echoed in 
literature arguing that contract structures may crowd out trust generally (including 
perhaps in noncontractual as well as contractual relationships)77, because agents 
acting under legal constraints cannot reliably signal that they are personally 
trustworthy.78 In the case of coauthored creative works, one scholar has suggested 
that the existence of a contractual arrangement between coauthors may either crowd 
out or crowd in the motivation to collaborate, depending on how the parties view the 
contract.79 Another has specifically discussed whether the use of contracts in marital 
relationships may crowd out trustworthiness between spouses.80 A recent modeling 
study has also noted that the presence of courts can encourage parties to continue 
                                                                                                                
73. Id. at 277. 
74. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: 
Comment on Feldman, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53, 61–63 (2011) (suggesting that civil 
penalties provided by tort law crowded out Ford’s moral imperative to correct malfunctioning 
gas caps on the Pinto model); see also Bruno Deffains & Claude Fluet, Legal Liability When 
Individuals Have Moral Concerns, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 930, 930 (2012); Joseph C. Storch, 
3-D Printing Your Way Down the Garden Path: 3-D Printers, the Copyrightization of Patents, 
and a Method for Manufacturers To Avoid the Entertainment Industry’s Fate, 3 N.Y.U. J.
INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 249, 271 (2014) (suggesting that lawsuits against students sharing 
music sharing crowded out moral motivations to pay for content). 
75. See Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 
1611, 1613 (2006); Florian Herold, Contractual Incompleteness as a Signal of Trust, 68 
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 180, 188 (2010). 
76. Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract 
Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 131 (2001); Alessandra 
Cassar, Giovanna d’Adda & Pauline Grosjean, Institutional Quality, Culture, and Norms of 
Cooperation: Evidence from Behavioral Field Experiments, 57 J.L. & ECON. 821, 821–22 
(2014). 
77. See Brent Simpson & Kimmo Eriksson, The Dynamics of Contracts and Generalized 
Trustworthiness, 21 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 59, 74 (2009) (also cited by M. Neil Browne & 
Katherine S. Fister, The Intriguing Potential of Postnuptial Contract Modifications, 23 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 187, 196 n.49 (2012)). 
78. See Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1491–92 (2005) (citing studies 
demonstrating that extrinsic incentives, including legal environments, can undermine trust and 
reciprocity). 
79. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Unplanned Coauthorship, 100 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1747–48 
(2014). 
80. See Browne & Fister, supra note 77, at 196–200 (noting this concern but nonetheless 
arguing that trustworthiness is often insufficient, and that marital contracts may have a 
stabilizing effect). 
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dealing with individuals who have breached prior agreements, thereby crowding out 
reputational enforcement mechanisms for cooperative agreements.81
6. Charitable Activity and Public Goods 
Because crowding-out concerns often focus on the erosion of altruism, 
scholarship has raised crowding-out questions in connection with tax breaks for 
charitable contributions,82 pro bono requirements for attorneys,83 mandatory rules for 
charitable conduct,84 and community service requirements for high school students.85
This category also includes the potential that giving for-profit firms subsidies to 
engage in charitable work will crowd out intrinsic motivation for employees to work 
for charitable organizations instead of for-profit firms.86 An analogous area is 
individual contributions to public goods. Research on motivational crowding-out has 
examined the use of financial incentives or penalties to motivate contributions, such 
as whether financial incentives influence citizens’ willingness to accept a NIMBY 
project—such as a nuclear waste repository—in their community for the greater 
good.87 Motivational crowding-out research has also examined the effect of 
mandated contributions, with similar concerns.88
7. Tax Law 
Tax compliance is another area subject to motivational crowding-out effects. On 
the theory that individual citizens may pay taxes due to intrinsic motivations, such 
as civic duty or a preference for following the rule of law, “distrusting” systems of 
                                                                                                                
81. Scott E. Masten & Jens Prüfer, On the Evolution of Collective Enforcement 
Institutions: Communities and Courts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 361–62 (2014).
82. See Wendy C. Gerzog, Alms to the Rich: The Façade Easement Deduction, 34 VA.
TAX REV. 229, 234 n.14 (2014); Atiq, supra note 61, at 1097–98. These concerns may also 
apply to the reduction in death duties to allow for gifts made to charity. See 26 U.S.C. § 2055 
(2012); see also YMCA v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47, 50 (1924) (explaining § 2055 as a “deal” made 
with testators before death, offering reduced death duties in exchange for altruistic gifts). 
83. See Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tending the Generous Heart: Mandatory Pro Bono and 
Moral Development, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 459, 460–61 (2001). 
84. See Brian Sheppard & Fiery Cushman, Evaluating Norms: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Relationship Between Norm-Content, Operator, and Charitable Behavior, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 55, 79–80 (2010). 
85. See Mark S. Sobus, Mandating Community Service: Psychological Implications of 
Requiring Prosocial Behavior, 19 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 153–54 (1995).  
86. See Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213, 1222–25 (2010) 
(concluding that the inability to rely on image and self-image motivations will require firms 
to pay higher wages and monitor employees more intensively for self-dealing, compared to 
the costs of current nonprofit firms carrying out charity work).  
87. See Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 3, at 746–47; Bruno S. Frey, Felix 
Oberholzer-Gee & Reiner Eichenberger, The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals 
and Markets, 104 J. POL. ECON. 1297, 1297–98 (1996); Kahan, supra note 71, at 85–89. 
88. See Andrew F. Reeson & John G. Tisdell, Institutions, Motivations and Public Goods: 
An Experimental Test of Motivational Crowding, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 273, 273–74 
(2008).
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tax enforcement that include penalties and increased surveillance may produce 
motivational crowding-out. For example, several scholars have suggested that tax 
evasion may increase in response to penalties for nonpayment89 or publicized 
audits.90 Tax credits, such as credits for entrepreneurs,91 also provide countless 
opportunities for understanding how such incentives affect intrinsic motivations. 
8. Intellectual Property and Innovation 
The intrinsic motivations driving creative activity may also be vulnerable to 
crowding-out effects, and many legal scholars have expressed concern about the use 
of market-based incentives, financial rewards, tax-exempt status, and intellectual 
property rights for individuals and organizations engaged in innovation.92 Several 
articles have included particular concerns about motivational crowding-out in 
response to state support for the arts through grants and subsidies,93 financial 
incentives and property rights relating to the development of shared goods, such as 
open-source software or distributed computing projects,94 entitlements for open 
                                                                                                                
89. See Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like To Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for 
Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 203–04 
(2013).  
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PSYCHOL. 491 (2005)); Fleisig-Greene, supra note 11, at 1238–39; Kahan, supra note 71, at 
83–85; Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1781, 1807–08, 1813 (2000). But see Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax 
Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1079–80, 1080 n.63 (2003) (rejecting the theory as 
applied to publicized audits and criminal penalties for tax evasion).  
91. See Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the Power of the Bet: Wagering with the 
Government as a Mechanism for Social and Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 810 
(1991). 
92. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher 
Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1943–44 (2014) (summarizing arguments); Wendy J. Gordon, Render 
Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 90–91 (2004) 
(noting “skepticism about claims that any monetization will trigger the collapse of entire fields 
of emotional connection into cash calculation,” but also suggesting that awarding monetary 
remedies for copyright cases “affected by the public interest” may “undermine authors’ 
emotional conception of their task”); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the 
Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303, 352–55 (2013) (noting that crowding-out is not 
“inevitable,” but that the design incentives for innovation should be mindful of this possibility 
and seek to complement, not displace, “nonmonetary motivations”). 
93. See Bruno S. Frey, State Support and Creativity in the Arts: Some New 
Considerations, 23 J. CULTURAL ECON. 71, 81–82 (1999).  
94. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 99–127 (2006); Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On 
Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 
YALE L.J. 273, 278, 357 (2004) (noting that uncompensated social sharing arrangements may 
outperform price-based and government-funded systems with equal functionality); Kahan, 
supra note 71, at 93–95. 
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science,95 incentives for the production of shared cultural or knowledge commons,96
and the use of market mechanisms in the music industry.97  
9. Criminal Law 
The use of incentives in criminal law and jury trials has also provoked crowding-
out concerns. For example, Tom Tyler has suggested that the use of surveillance to 
monitor and punish crime begets more surveillance, because punishment shifts 
agents’ attention to “instrumental factors” that crowd out prosocial motivations like 
morality and peer opinion.98 This concern recalls prior scholarship noting the 
potential for criminal penalties to strengthen motivations to engage in criminal acts99
such as fraud,100 or that increased penalties and street-level policing may 
inadvertently increase crime.101 More generally, others have argued that the 
compensation of jurors may undermine their perceived significance of their role as a 
civic responsibility102 or that civic virtue generally is crowded out by the availability 
of adversary institutions for resolving disputes.103  
Tracy Meares has suggested a system of financial incentives for prosecutors, 
providing case-by-case rewards in order to shape charging decisions and to motivate 
adherence to ethical rules.104 This proposal is intended to harness prosecutors’ 
preferences not necessarily for money, but for victory and status.105 Meares has 
highlighted a number of other areas where financial incentives play a role in the 
criminal justice system, including rewards offered by the Secret Service106 and local 
communities for information leading to arrest or convictions, or the qui tam action 
under the federal False Claims Act.107 The literature on motivational crowding-out 
was relatively small at the time of Meares’s proposal, but these incentive practices 
                                                                                                                
95. See Liza S. Vertinsky, Making Room for Cooperative Innovation, 41 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1067, 1085–86 (2014). 
96. See Wendy J. Gordon, Discipline and Nourish: On Constructing Commons, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 733, 748–49 (2010); Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How To 
Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 1024–25 (2012). 
97. See Benkler, supra note 94, at 342. 
98. Tom R. Tyler, Reducing Corporate Criminality: The Role of Values, 51 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 267, 286 (2014). 
99. See Sherry F. Colb, Oil and Water: Why Retribution and Repentance Do Not Mix, 22 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 59, 83 (2003). 
100. Kahan, supra note 71, at 99, 101. 
101. Id. at 101. 
102. Evan R. Seamone, A Refreshing Jury Cola: Fulfilling the Duty To Compensate Jurors 
Adequately, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 379 (2002). 
103. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 5 J. ECON. SURVEYS
589, 599 (2001) (citing studies). 
104. Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851 (1995); see also Miriam H. 
Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48 (2015) (arguing that excessive oversight of 
prosecutors “may . . . crowd out and undermine intrinsic motivations to comply with law”).
105. Meares, supra note 104. 
106. Id. at 856 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3056(c)(1)(D) (1994)). 
107. Id. at 858 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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may now be revisited with motivational crowding-out in mind. Crowding-out effects 
might also be considered in relation to the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994, which permits up to a one-year sentence reduction for a 
defendant’s successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program;108 Senate debate 
on this provision considered the relevance of motivation to the effectiveness of drug 
rehabilitation, with the concern that prisoners motivated by a mandate or sentence 
reduction may derive less benefit from rehabilitation services.109 Incentives for guilty 
pleas, good behavior in prison,110 or for providing information or assistance111 may 
also be usefully considered through the lens of motivational crowding-out.  
10. Education 
Researchers in education policy and law are also attuned to motivational 
crowding-out effects. Concerns in this field include the worry that an emphasis on 
“extrinsic motivations” such as grades, test scores, and job prospects may crowd out 
intrinsic motivations for learning, such as curiosity,112 as well as intrinsic motivations 
for teaching, such as genuine concern for pupils’ development.113 These concerns 
have prompted objections to New York City’s efforts to offer cash rewards for school 
attendance,114 and other “dollars for scholars” programs that have taken place in the 
U.S. and elsewhere.115
11. Property Law, Trusts, and Estates 
Legal scholarship has considered motivational crowding-out in several areas of 
property law. For example, federal and state governments offer financial incentives 
to encourage private landowners to grant public access to their lands, but these have 
drawn scrutiny on the basis that they may crowd out altruistic motives for providing 
public access.116 One scholar has also expressed concern that “incentive trusts”
—trust funds that impose conditions on beneficiaries’ behavior with little leeway for 
                                                                                                                
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B) (2012 & Supp. V); see also Bellis v. Davis, 186 F.3d 1092 
(8th Cir. 1999); Winick, supra note, 91, at 810. 
109. See 140 CONG. REC. S12,356 (daily ed. Aug. 23, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden) 
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110. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 91, at 810. 
111. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b); see also supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text discussing 
incentives for informants. 
112. See KOHN, supra note 49; SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 177–81, 187; Peter 
H. Huang, Tiger Cub Strikes Back: Memoirs of an Ex-Child Prodigy about Legal Education 
and Parenting, 1 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 297, 301 (2012). 
113. SCHWARTZ & SHARPE, supra note 38, at 177–81, 187. 
114. Barry Schwartz, Money for Nothing, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/02/opinion/02schwartz.html [https://perma.cc/EH6J-G6GP].  
115. For an overview of some of these programs, see IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS 
26−27 (2011) [hereinafter AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS].
116. See Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right To Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
949, 980 (2013). 
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exceptions—may train beneficiaries’ attention on money while undermining 
intrinsic motivations for achievement.117
12. Other Incentives in U.S. Law and Policy 
Concerns about motivational crowding-out have also influenced scholarship on 
the law of democracy (discussing whether compulsory voting may crowd out civic 
motivations to vote),118 international law (discussing whether formal systems for 
international dispute resolution may facilitate breach by crowding out reputational 
motivations to fulfill commitments),119 and communications law (considering 
whether paying television broadcasters to produce more public interest broadcasting 
may lead them to reduce their voluntary public interest programming activity).120
Beyond these examples of scholarly discussion about motivational crowding-out 
effects, there are also many areas where crowding-out concerns may not have been 
raised directly, but where further discussion in this area may be useful. Gerrit De 
Geest and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci have provided a cross-disciplinary overview of 
incentives used to motivate individual behavior under U.S. law, particularly in 
settings characterized by complexity, specialization, and divisions of labor.121 In 
addition to many of the incentives already discussed above, they have also 
highlighted incentives for military recruitment,122 bonuses for contract 
performance,123 privately offered awards for recovering lost property,124 and 
incentives for submitting to regulatory takings.125  
II. HAZARDS OF MOTIVATIONAL CROWDING-OUT
As the prior section suggests, concerns about crowding-out attach to many 
different proposed harms. But to date discussions of these harms have been 
imprecise, not only in legal scholarship, but throughout the many fields of academic 
work on this phenomenon. Scholars typically express concern about one effect (most 
frequently overall disengagement), but the effects of crowding-out are far more 
complex, and different consequences may be salient in different contexts. To address 
                                                                                                                
117. Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 
REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 445, 489–91 (2006). 
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121. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 13, at 347, 392. 
122. Id. at 386. 
123. Id. at 343–44, 384–85. 
124. Id. at 377–78; see also Winick, supra note 91, at 820–21. 
125. De Geest & Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 13, at 379–81. 
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these concerns systematically and cogently, either through incentive design or the 
regulation of incentive-based policies, a full accounting of crowding-out harms is 
needed.  
To complement my previous work on the causes of crowding-out,126 this Part will 
analyze the heterogeneous impacts of motivational crowding-out, including 
attitudinal or moral effects, impacts on autonomy, and behavioral harms. This Part 
focuses only on purported harms; the following Part will propose a novel raft of 
benefits. 
A. Behavioral Impacts  
Apart from the effects of incentives on autonomy, much of the literature on 
motivational crowding out focuses on its instrumental impacts. I will now consider 
each of these in turn.  
1. Temporarily Reduced Engagement and Playing Hard-to-Get
Reduced agent effort or engagement, including active behavior in the opposite 
direction from what is incentivized, is the most obvious and frequently discussed 
crowding-out effect. For example, increasing the penalties for tax evasion may result 
in more tax evasion, while paying people to exercise may reduce their trips to the 
gym. We might call this the “classic” crowding-out effect, and I have elsewhere 
described nine mechanisms by which agents might lower their effort levels due to an 
absolute reduction in intrinsic motivation.127 Following a distinction proposed by 
Samuel Bowles, some scholars separate “categorical effects,” in which crowding-out 
occurs regardless of how large the incentive is, from “marginal effects,” in which the 
magnitude of crowding-out depends on the incentive size.128
Temporarily reduced effort, however, can also result from a relative loss of 
intrinsic motivation compared to extrinsic motivation. When extrinsic motivation 
becomes the primary reason for acting, agents may be more inclined to engage in 
“gaming” behavior to maximize their rewards, such as “playing hard to get.”129 A
principal who offers an incentive signals that the agent’s behavior has value in a 
market.130 A sophisticated agent may interpret the incentive as a first offer, inferring 
the principal is privately willing to pay more. In response, the agent may temporarily 
reduce his efforts to create an artificial scarcity, thereby driving up the price of his 
performance.131 Galle has called this “anticipatory and strategic crowd-out.”132 The 
agent may also obscure his (privately known) intrinsic motivation, ability, or the 
                                                                                                                
126. Underhill, When Extrinsic, supra note 5. 
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costs of his activity to convince the principal that higher incentives are needed.133
Concerns about temporary or individual gaming behavior to bid up prices have 
occurred elsewhere in the crowding-out literature, such as discussions about payment 
for organ donation; one of the rational bases for the NOTA’s prohibition, as cited in 
the Flynn decision, was that a pay-for-donation system would allow “every last cent 
[to] be extracted from sick patients needful of transplants, by well-matched potential 
donors making ‘your money or your life’ offers.”134 Similarly, offering rewards to 
induce tax evaders to begin paying may cause previously compliant agents to begin 
evading taxes so that they might subsequently claim a reward for good behavior.135
In another intriguing example, Galle notes that during the financial crisis, the 
Treasury Department considered offering financial incentives to banks to encourage 
lending; public commentators warned that if they did not implement or reject the 
policy immediately, banks seeking to maximize their income and ensure adoption of 
the policy would refuse to lend until the subsidies were in place, which would 
compound the temporary hardship.136
To date, there has been little empirical investigation of the playing-hard-to-get 
theory. One test of this phenomenon is the aforementioned Swiss study of siting a 
nuclear waste repository, in which the offer of payment reduced by half the 
proportion of residents who were willing to accept the facility in their town.137 The 
authors considered whether the residents were simply holding out in hopes that the 
government would increase its offer of compensation. They dismissed this 
possibility, however, when a follow-up question found that only five percent of 
respondents believed the amount was insufficient; moreover, respondents who 
declined initial amounts were offered higher amounts in hypothetical scenarios, and 
almost none agreed to accept more.138  
2. Sustainability and Future Engagement 
Throughout the literature on crowding, a common concern is that although 
external incentives may motivate behavior or produce “temporary compliance”139 in 
the short term, they may backfire in the long term, becoming “negative reinforcers 
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once they are withdrawn.”140 That is, “once a reward is offered, it will be required—
and ‘expected’—every time the task has to be performed again—perhaps even in 
increasing amounts. . . . [R]ewards have a ‘rachet effect.’”141 Detrimental effects on 
future effort may follow if extrinsic incentives cause a permanent and absolute 
reduction in intrinsic motivation.142 This may, for example, be due to endogenous 
preference changes, a changed view of the task as a transaction, or changes in the 
agent’s perceptions.143 It may also arise from a desire to avoid being taken advantage 
of; for example, incentivized agents may view uncompensated behavior as a waste 
of time.144  
Long-term crowding-out is particularly problematic for incentives that are 
intended to induce habit formation,145 although it is not problematic for incentives 
intended to have only a temporary effect.146 One example of the former is financial 
incentives to motivate behavior among children, including reading books, obtaining 
good grades, and contributing to household chores. If a child is paid to read books, 
the theory goes, she indeed may read more books while the incentive is offered.147
But once the child is an adult, she will no longer be paid to read, and she may decide 
to stop reading because it is no longer financially beneficial; the incentive 
permanently eroded her motivation to read. If the child had never been paid, she 
might have developed a love for reading for other reasons, and she may have 
continued to read in adulthood without pay. Some evidence suggests that if 
undergraduate students who already visit the gym regularly are offered financial 
incentives for making repeat visits, they may attend the gym less after those 
incentives are removed; experimenters observed the reverse effect, however, among 
nonattenders who began visiting the gym when incentivized and then continued to 
do so (perhaps out of habit) after the incentives were removed.148 The experimenters 
concluded that incentives “should be targeted at people who currently do not exercise 
and must mandate enough practice hours for the habit to develop.”149 Subsequent 
research found that the lasting impact of incentives was stronger among participants 
                                                                                                                
140. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. ECON.
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149. Id. at 23; see also Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 205−06 (citing replications of the 
Charness and Gneezy study). 
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whose friends had also been assigned to the incentivized condition, suggesting that 
social network effects may play a role in the long-term effect of incentives.150
Another theory of future performance suggests that individuals may eventually 
forget their intrinsic interest in a given task; they may remember only that they 
engaged in the task and obtained the reward.151 When the decision recurs, the agent 
may not recall her intrinsic motivation, and she may therefore decline to engage in 
the task again without an incentive. If no incentive had been offered the first time, 
however, the ex post individual may rationalize her prior behavior by assuming that 
she had a personally meaningful rationale, and she may be more likely to undertake 
the action again. 
When the incentive is a penalty, evidence from at least one well-known study 
suggests that the counterproductive effects of penalizing bad behavior may be 
permanent. In this experiment, a day care levied a new fine on parents who picked 
up their children late; contrary to expectations, the frequency of late pickups 
increased, perhaps because the fine served as a cheap “price” that crowded out 
parents’ intrinsic motivations to arrive on time.152 Although the fine was removed 
several weeks later, the higher frequency of late pickups remained.153 Similarly, a 
modeling study of financial incentives for prosocial activity found that after an 
incentive has decreased contributions to a public good, withdrawing the incentives 
may not restore prior contribution levels; rather, withdrawing incentives altogether 
at that point may even further reduce contributions because even the selfish
contributors are no longer interested.154 Taken together, these studies suggest a 
concerning norm: “Once a commodity, always a commodity.”155 Or in other words, 
a change in reference point is difficult to reverse.156 Interestingly, however, Fehr and 
Falk have noted that current research may conflate long-term crowding-out of 
intrinsic motivation with a more fleeting “disappointment effect,” which triggers loss 
aversion and negative reciprocity when a previously anticipated reward is 
removed.157 Support for this idea may be found in a study of a manufacturing 
company that removed a long-standing incentive plan intended to boost production 
among its welders. Although production initially declined, rates of production 
                                                                                                                
150. See Gneezy et al., supra note 46, at 205−06 (citing Philip Babcock & John Hartman,
Exercising in Herds: Treatment Size and Status Specific Peer Effects in a Randomized 
Exercise Intervention (Aug. 2010) (unpublished research paper), 
http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~hartman/Research_papers_files/ExerciseHerd_2010_08.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3S2C-H7ME]).  
151. Bénabou & Tirole, Motivation, supra note 140, at 506. 
152. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (2000)
[hereinafter Gneezy & Rushtichini, A Fine Is a Price].
153. Id.
154. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Ewa Mendys-Kamphorst, The Price of a Price: On the 
Crowding Out and In of Social Norms, 55 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 377, 392 (2004) (also 
suggesting that crowding-out of social norms may not be permanent, but that the regeneration 
of a social norm may take a long time). 
155. Gneezy & Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, supra note 152, at 14. 
156. Gneezy & Rustichini, Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All, supra note 53.
157. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON.
REV. 687, 717 (2002). 
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recovered over the ensuing months and ultimately matched earlier rates of 
productivity.158 Studies are needed to evaluate this possibility. 
3. Reduced Quality of Performance: Choking, Distraction, Performance 
Orientation, and Gaming 
Another concern is whether the reduction in intrinsic motivation will change or 
degrade the nature of individuals’ activity.159 Empirical research has shown that 
intrinsic motivation is positively correlated with learning,160 curiosity,161
satisfaction,162 sustainable behavior change,163 performance quality, and (to a lesser 
degree) performance quantity for tasks that have a quantity component.164 Concerns 
about detrimental impacts of incentives on performance quality are more likely to 
arise when crowding represents a relative loss of intrinsic motivation compared to 
extrinsic motivation; that is, where people previously engaged in an activity 
primarily because of some intrinsic reason, an extrinsic reward or penalty may 
change their balance of motivations, such that the extrinsic motivations play a larger 
role than intrinsic motivation in driving behavior.165 The comprehensive meta-
analysis of crowding effects across 183 primary studies found that “intrinsic 
motivation mattered more for quality than extrinsic incentives[,] and extrinsic 
incentives explained more of the variance in quantity performance criteria than did 
intrinsic motivation.”166 This may be because quality requires more complex and 
skillful tasks, which require high engagement and even personal investment; tasks 
measured primarily by quantity are often less cognitively demanding.167 The three 
explanations most frequently given for reduced quality of performance in the 
presence of rewards are choking, distraction, and a change in focus from “progress” 
to “performance” orientation.
Reduced quality of performance in the presence of high-stakes incentives can be 
explained as “choking”:168 that is, when individuals are highly motivated by large 
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incentives, they may exhibit worse performance on skill-based tasks (particularly 
those involving cognitive skills), although perhaps not on tasks that involve effort 
alone.169 Mechanisms proposed for this effect include suggestions that large 
incentives prompt greater self-consciousness, an excessively narrow focus of 
attention, or an excess of arousal.170 On its face, choking will look indistinguishable 
from an absolute loss of intrinsic motivation: in both cases, the introduction of a 
financial incentive may result in comparatively worse performance. But choking 
behavior is actually an effect of a relative reduction in intrinsic motivation. Here, the 
incentive becomes the primary driver of behavior, and individuals are too motivated 
in response171: their desire to obtain the large prize hampers the exercise of cognitive 
skill required to perform the task. Choking effects cannot be remedied by increasing 
the size of the incentive; the problem in choking is precisely that the incentive is 
already too high. 
A second problem is that rewards may be distracting—they divert the agent’s 
attention away from the task and toward the reward or penalty.172 Even if the 
incentive does not interfere with motivation, it may interfere with the agent’s ability 
to perform well. Indeed, to incentivize creative tasks, it may be preferable to use 
small rewards, or large rewards that are less salient, such as rewards that are placed 
out of sight during the performance of the task.173 Kelli Alces and Brian Galle have 
discussed this in the context of availability bias, in which agents become so focused 
on one item (reward) that cognitive performance on other tasks suffers; they further 
note that agents, such as executives, may focus so much on their largest or most 
salient incentive that manipulating other incentives may not influence 
performance.174 One example of this may be the extent to which command-and-
control regulations divert agents’ attention to compliance requirements and avoiding 
penalties, thereby undermining risk-taking and resources for innovation or quality 
improvement; writing in the area of health care management, Robert Gatter suggests 
that this effect may be seen as an instance of crowding-out.175
A third mechanism by which extrinsic incentives can reduce performance quality 
is that they change agents’ focus from “progress” (or “mastery”) to “performance.”176
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Performance orientation may lead to excessive emphasis on immediate rewards at 
the expense of long-run benefits.177 For example, people paid to solve problems may 
select easier problems, and people paid to read books may select those that are shorter 
and easier.178 In education, some have argued that merit scholarships incentivize 
higher grades, but also lead students to select easier courses to safeguard their 
grades.179 A randomized trial of an incentive scheme found that once children had 
obtained the maximum annual reward for reading achievement, their subsequent 
reading performance declined compared to those who had never been incentivized.180
Where intellectual property protection is available for academic science, some have 
suggested that financial incentives may lead academics to move their research 
programs toward commercially marketable lines of inquiry.181 These may each be 
viewed as an example of “gaming” behavior, however innocuous—in every case, 
“people whose livelihoods are based on an index will figure out how to manipulate 
it.”182 A complementary concern is that reward-focused individuals may fear 
revealing signs of weakness or incompetence, making them less likely to seek help 
from the principal; without help, their progress may suffer.183 This poses problems 
for both short- and long-term performance quality and skill development. 
When agents are providing services to third parties, loss of performance quality 
can lead to negative externalities. In health care, for example, pay-for-performance 
strategies condition some percentage of provider compensation based on indicators 
of quality, resource use, and patient-reported outcomes; one common concern about 
such programs is that they induce healthcare providers to select against high-risk, 
severely ill, or noncompliant patients that could count against performance 
metrics.184 Theorists have also expressed worry that these pay-for-performance 
programs lead providers to “focus disproportionately on aspects of care that are 
incentivized and possibly neglect other important aspects that are not,” and 
rewarding providers based on metrics may also create unintended incentives for 
manipulating data or gaming systems to maximize rewards.185 Over the long term, 
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these effects of relative crowding-out may exacerbate healthcare inequalities.186
Empirical evidence for each of these concerns (selecting against high-risk patients, 
neglecting unincentivized care, and gaming) is mixed.187 Similar dynamics may 
occur when teachers or schools are incentivized on the basis of their pupils’ 
standardized test results, leading them to focus only on marginal students capable of 
improving their performance to a passing standard, rather than highly talented or 
highly challenged students.188
4. Agent Selection Effects 
A fourth concern about crowding is that introducing a financial incentive will 
change the distribution of individuals who engage in the behavior of interest. For 
example, when incentives increase for a given behavior, particularly a prosocial 
behavior, they may repel “more public-spirited agents” while attracting “greedy” 
people who may care less about the underlying cause.189 This cumulative impact can 
occur only when an incentive is available to all comers—or at least to a population 
of individuals not already engaged in the behavior at baseline. Even if the absolute 
number of individuals engaging in the behavior does not change (i.e., enough selfish 
people join in to counteract the loss of generous people), the rebalancing may have 
several downstream impacts. These include shifting the burden of the activity, 
lowering the quality of performance, and impairing the group’s image.190 Incentives 
may also lead to gaming behavior that changes the identity of incentive recipients. 
For example, some have argued that when subsidies are offered to people with 
income below a certain threshold (e.g., as in the Affordable Care Act), it encourages 
people to underreport or purposely lower their income to that threshold.191 Several 
legal scholars have also noted that when incentives are offered to stop bad behavior, 
they may attract new entrants to engage in bad behavior in order to obtain payment 
for stopping.192
When an incentive changes the population of agents who participate in a particular 
activity, group differences may in fact shift the burden or benefits of a given activity 
to a new demographic. For example, evaluations of incentives for school 
achievement have found that incentives increased certification and college 
attendance for girls but not boys, and increased academic performance for high-
ability but not low-ability students.193 Another important example is once again 
blood donation. I have already noted the finding that offering payment may lead to 
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reduced blood donation by women, without influencing donation rates for men;194
survey studies also note a greater propensity for crowding-out among older and more 
experienced blood donors.195 This dynamic across an entire population would 
reallocate the burdens and benefits of blood donation, and some express concern that 
donors motivated by incentives may be less honest about their health histories.196
Response to monetary incentives may also depend on the setting; one survey study 
suggested that Austrian blood donors may increase donation in response to 
nonmonetary rewards, but Italian and Swedish donors may not.197 Concerns about 
the balance of activity benefits and harms also extend to organ donation. A
simulation study of organ donation incentives found that market incentives may 
“induce the relatively poor to donate [organs] while not having a significant effect 
on the choices of wealthy donors.”198 Some have suggested that paying low wages 
for military service can be a way to avoid recruits with mercenary motivations.199
Others have worried that paying for medical research participation can affect the 
sample of human subjects, and therefore influence the generalizability of findings.200  
5. Inefficient Competition among Principals and Agents 
When principals compete for agents’ time and resources, particularly when they 
are seeking agents to engage in prosocial activities, this competition can also drive 
up incentives,201 exacerbating crowding-out concerns about the quality of 
participation and identity of agents. This competition may produce also excessive 
participation by less public-spirited or less qualified agents.202 These concerns may 
be illustrated by the payment of incentives for human subjects to participate in 
research. At least one study suggests that paid research subjects view their 
participation as a type of employment, extending even to sharing information about 
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different studies’ “conditions of employment.”203 This worries some researchers, 
who fear that competition for subjects will ultimately increase the cost of research 
and price out low-cost studies.204 Reliance on research participation income (enabled 
by access to many paying studies) may also encourage potential participants to lie 
about eligibility for high-paying studies, thereby interfering with the validity of study 
results.  
Some have also suggested that the availability of individual rewards may harm 
relationships among agents who are expected to collaborate. When rewards are in 
limited supply or based on performance relative to one’s peers, agents must not only 
compete for the incentive, but also continue working alongside their peers who have 
won or lost.205 The negative impact on collective effort and cooperation may 
outweigh benefits of the incentive in these scenarios.206 One vignette study has 
examined the potential impact of awards for cooperation on research teams at a 
technology institution; the study suggested that although the receipt of an award may 
increase motivation to collaborate, nonreceipt of the award may also deter 
disappointed losers, who reported lower subsequent motivation to cooperate with 
colleagues.207
6. Spillovers and Horizontal Creep  
Some have expressed concern that motivational crowding-out may affect multiple 
behaviors.208 Bruno Frey and Matthias Benz refer to this as the “motivation transfer” 
or “motivational spill-over” effect, by which incentives can depress motivation in 
new, unincentivized areas, often by altering the nature of the relationship between 
the principal and the agent.209 Horizontal creep may also be the anxiety behind 
concerns about “self-regulation”; for example, Deci, Ryan, and Koestner suggest that 
“the primary negative of effects of rewards is that they tend to . . . undermine people’s 
taking responsibility for motivating or regulating themselves.”210 As a result, 
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institutions’ short-term efforts to control agents’ behavior through incentives may 
cause long-term or generalized harm.211  
Frey illustrates spillovers with an example from environmental policy, where 
“[i]nstruments such as effluent charges or tradable permits work efficiently where 
they are applied, but the induced substitute of environmental ethics by monetary 
incentives leads people to protect the environment less in those areas where the 
instruments are not applied.”212 Stern has also discussed how incentives may crowd 
out intrinsic motivation for environmental conservation across the board, suggesting 
that incentivized agents begin to view uncompensated activity as unattractive. This 
loss of motivation may undermine other environmentally responsible activities or 
voting decisions.213 Similar effects may obtain when extrinsic incentives are 
punitive, causing undesirable behavior in unpunished areas to escalate. In other 
spillover applications, Frey suggests that distrustful legal rules may undermine good 
behavior by citizens, that paying for siting NIMBY projects may undermine civic 
virtue for other public activities, and that incentives for employees may undermine 
motivations to engage in unincentivized activity.214 Horizontal creep of motivational 
crowding-out is particularly worrisome when multiple activities stem from the same 
type of motivation, when they involve the same “material content” such as 
environmentalism, when they activate similar cultural norms, or when they take 
place in the same principal-agent relationship (such as the relationship between a 
government and citizens).215 For example, one analysis suggests that changes over 
time in civic norms are simultaneously linked to changes in voter participation, 
charitable contributions, and social cooperation activities.216  
In addition to horizontal creep across activities, some evidence may also suggest 
horizontal creep of motivational crowding-out across groups of people in geography 
and time.217 This is consistent with the endogenous preferences theory of 
motivational crowding-out, and it finds some support in empirical evidence.218  
B. Autonomy Impacts 
In the case of negative incentives (penalties) and mandates, the autonomy 
problems posed by extrinsic incentives are obvious: agents lose choice options, or 
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certain choices will now put them in a worse position ex post. But autonomy concerns 
may also arise from positive incentives—prizes and rewards. Motivational crowding-
out, as I have described it, is an absolute or relative reduction in intrinsic motivation 
due to an extrinsic incentive. But this raises the somewhat semantic question of 
whether crowding out is itself the loss of autonomy (in this case, a displacement of 
one’s own motivations by a principal’s extrinsic incentive), or whether crowding out 
is evidence of a loss of autonomy. For the purposes of this Article, I believe it may 
be unnecessary to parse this distinction; it is sufficient to note that motivational 
crowding-out is bound up with ways in which incentives, both positive and negative, 
may impair autonomous decision making.  
1. Undue Inducement, Coercion, and “Disabling Choice”
As Ruth Grant has noted, incentives are not only a form of trade, but also a form
of exerting power over the agent, somewhere between exerting force and persuading 
the agent to act.219 Moreover, “when incentives are in fact deliberate tools of policy, 
the equality of the parties involved ought not to be assumed.”220 Others have worried 
that incentives can stifle discussion about alternatives.221 Large incentives can indeed 
limit autonomous choices; when an incentive is so attractive as to be irresistible, it 
may carry disproportionate weight in the agent’s decision. Concerns about agent 
autonomy in the face of positive incentives generally occur when an agent is 
incentivized to do something risky or to his detriment, such as participating in 
medical research222 or donating an organ,223 although other scholars have regarded 
these claims with skepticism.224 Concerns of undue influence, however, have also 
been raised in relation to workplace wellness programs225 and other incentive 
programs such as conditional International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans to 
low-income countries.226  
In his book on commitment contracting, Ian Ayres discusses the potential of 
financial incentives to be “disabling” when they are large enough. When an agent 
tries to bind himself to a choice, for example, setting a high price for bad behavior 
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can effectively put choices out of reach.227 Although most incentives set prices for 
behaviors that force the agent to internalize the full costs and benefits of his activity, 
commitment contracts use super-incentives to make choices easy.228 That is, “no 
rational future self” would choose to forgo the reward or incurred the penalty in lieu 
of performance.229 Ayres offers many examples of these self-imposed incentives, 
including a fine of $5000 for smoking one cigarette,230 a “kosher” telephone that 
imposes more than a $2-per-minute surcharge for Sabbath calls,231 and medications 
that induce vomiting upon ingestion of alcohol.232 Ayres’s work focuses on situations 
where agents set their own incentives (i.e., the agent and principal are the same), 
which do not raise autonomy concerns.233 But it is easy to imagine these types of 
incentives set by a separate principal.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the possibility of coercive incentives in its 
jurisprudence regarding the Taxing and Spending Clause,234 finding that the 
conditions imposed on federal funds rendered “coercive” taxing and spending 
programs such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933235 and the penalty for 
Medicaid expansion in the Affordable Care Act.236 This line of cases underscores 
that although the point at which financial incentives become “coercion” may be 
difficult to discern, Congress may indeed undermine state autonomy by offering 
incentives that are too large. Many cases have noted the difficulty of line-drawing in 
such cases; as Justice Cardozo noted in 1937, “the location of the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a question of 
degree,—at times, perhaps, of fact.”237 When the Court revisited this question in 
South Dakota v. Dole in 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion again 
noted that “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress 
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’
but that the penalty of losing five percent of highway funds in exchange for failing 
to raise the drinking age did not cross the line.238 In the most recent formulation of 
this rule, Chief Justice Roberts has held that although the Court has not “‘fix[ed] the 
outermost line’ where persuasion gives way to coercion,” the Affordable Care Act 
reached beyond this line by requiring states to expand Medicaid as a condition of 
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accepting any Medicaid funds.239 Concerns about undue influence have also arisen 
in connection with the conditions under the No Child Left Behind Act.240
2. Intrusiveness 
In order to administer an incentive plan, the principal must also impose some 
mechanism for behavior monitoring and measurement: in a word, carrots and sticks 
demand surveillance. Whether the incentive is negative or positive, as Kohn has 
noted, “what is essentially taking place in both approaches is that a lot of people are 
getting caught.”241 Climates of “greater surveillance, evaluation, and competition” 
have been independently suggested to negatively impact intrinsic motivation242 and 
limit exploration and learning.243 This has been discussed in environmental law as 
“the intrusion objection,” which argues that individual behaviors that lead to 
environmental harm often occur at home, and efforts to monitor and incentivize or 
penalize such behavior are too invasive.244 As Adrian Vermeule has noted, 
monitoring imposes costs on intrinsically motivated agents, and these costs can 
exacerbate bad behavior by selecting for “knaves.”245 Intrusiveness can thus 
exacerbate crowding-out effects through the mechanisms of impaired self-
determination and perceptions of principal hostility or agent trust, and it can increase 
agent selection effects. 
C. Attitudinal and Moral Impacts 
Crowding-out has motivated concern not only due to its effects on short- and long-
term behavior, but also for its effects on societal and individual values as an end in 
themselves.  
1. Societal Values  
The specters of spillovers, endogenous preference adaptation, and “motivation 
atrophy” have shaped the large-scale worry, expressed by scholars such as Grant, 
Schwarz, Sharpe, Bowles, and Sandel, that the crowding-out of intrinsic motivation 
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is destructive in the long term for values that should normatively shape modern 
societies, such as altruism and civic duty.246 For example, Michael Sandel has written 
that market mechanisms easily become “market norms” that limit the influence of 
nonmarket (moral) norms.247 Indeed, crowding-out is the cornerstone of Sandel’s 
“corruption objection” to allowing incentives and transactions into areas of life 
previously guided by social and moral norms.248 Grant likewise expresses concern 
that incentives limit debate over moral choices, noting that “once incentives are 
introduced in certain areas and people become habituated to their use, the important 
questions simply no longer arise,” citing the increased acceptability of plea 
bargaining as an example.249  
Scholars concerned about the erosion of societal values are often skeptical of 
economic efforts to make incentives “smarter” in order to avoid and eliminate 
perverse effects.250 Even if incentives have their desired behavioral effects, the 
displacement of motivations such as altruism, professional duty, public service, and 
civic duty may be harmful to the social fabric and to the process by which individuals 
internalize democratic values.251 To cure this harm, Sandel argues that the only 
remedy is a more comprehensive and inclusive social discussion about where market 
incentives should and should not be deployed, and which moral values should be 
preserved free of extrinsic influence.252  
2. Individual Values and Self-Respect 
When crowding-out produces an absolute decline in a (noble) intrinsic 
motivation, the decline in that motivation may well be viewed as an attitudinal or 
moral cost to the agent analogous to the change in societal values described above. 
For the individual, a second potential harm lurks in the possibility of reduced self-
respect for incentivized actions. That is, the agent’s perception of undue inducement 
may also reduce his or her own sense of personal achievement when an incentive has 
its intended effect. In his work on commitment contracting, Ayres tells the story of a
colleague who wanted to lose weight without resorting to a commitment contract: 
“‘What does it say about me as a person in terms of maturity, my self-control, if I 
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need to be nagged[?] . . . . I’d like to think that if this is a goal that’s important to me, 
I can accomplish it straight out.’”253  
Although Ayres encourages us to “resist the urge to think that all 
accomplishments achieved through extrinsic motivation are somehow less worthy 
than those achieved solely with intrinsic desire,” many individuals may nevertheless 
find their incentivized achievements to be less meaningful and even indicative of 
poor self-control.254 Sandel has echoed this view. In an exposition of incentives for 
health behaviors, such as weight loss and smoking, he expresses the concern that 
“bribe[s] may become habit forming,” undermining the self-respect that should 
motivate behavior change instead.255 Apart from the concern about whether 
incentivized behavior changes are sustainable, this prompts the question of whether 
individual preference changes in response to incentives may be an independent, 
moral harm to the agent.  
III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF CROWDING-OUT
The previous Part considered the harms that scholars have attributed to crowding-
out. In this Part, I depart from the conventional view of crowding-out harms to offer 
several potential benefits of displacing intrinsic motivation, including my own 
theories alongside benefits hypothesized by others. These proposed benefits are in 
need of empirical testing, but they provide a theoretically appealing set of ideas that 
may rehabilitate motivational crowding-out in some settings. 
A. Motivation Conservation 
Making choices is burdensome, and this burden takes a toll on our cognitive and 
physical capacities.256 For example, although willpower may indeed be strengthened 
in some ways, evidence also shows that it can be depleted, particularly in moments 
of decision fatigue.257 To the extent that incentives can clarify or simplify our 
choices—particularly those incentives that are irresistible—we may reap benefits by 
saving our energy for other and potentially more important or personal choices. In 
this way, crowding-out may help conserve motivation for situations where incentives 
are unavailable.  
Sandel has noted several cases where economic thinkers have made this argument, 
including in lectures and written work by Sir Dennis H. Robertson, Kenneth Arrow, 
and Lawrence Summers.258 In an elegant (though critical) restatement of this theory, 
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258. See SANDEL, supra note 221, at 126–30. 
1146 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 94:1109 
Sandel writes, “By promoting policies that rely, whenever possible, on self-interest 
rather than altruism or moral considerations, the economist saves society from 
squandering its scarce supply of virtue.”259 Where incentives reduce the need for 
intrinsic motivation, they may help us to conserve our energy for other situations. In 
a more nuanced argument, Ayres has distinguished the importance of intrinsic 
motivation for tasks that form part of one’s identity, compared to tasks that do not:  
Using extrinsic motivation on [a] less important task might mean that I 
have a greater capacity to marshal my intrinsic motivation to attend to 
the things that I really care about . . . . It’s because other things are more 
important in our lives that we should be open to using commitments to 
help on everything else.260  
But the idea of conserving motivation has drawn fire from those who believe that 
continual exertion of motivation is instead self-reinforcing. Sandel, for example, 
argues that “altruism, generosity, solidarity, and civic spirit . . . are more like muscles 
that develop and grow stronger with exercise. One of the defects of a market-driven 
society is that it lets these virtues languish.” 261  
Empirical research is needed to understand whether increased engagement in 
intrinsically motivated activities, such altruistic community service, strengthens or 
atrophies our moral muscles. But if incentives do indeed conserve valuable 
motivation for other causes, this may be an important benefit of crowding-out. 
B. Displacement of Invidious Motivations 
When concerns about motivational crowding-out arise in legal scholarship, they 
reflect a rosy view of human nature, with concerns about laudable intrinsic 
motivations such as altruism, civic duty, public service, and reciprocity. But some 
motivations may not be worth preserving,262 and at times the crowding-out of 
invidious motivations may be beneficial. Such motivations may include socially 
harmful interpersonal biases—including biases on the basis of race, gender, sexual 
orientation, or disability—which are well-documented and pernicious influences on 
opportunity and equal treatment. Debiasing strategies typically include attempts to 
insulate individuals from harm, efforts to intervene directly in biased behavior, and 
more subtle efforts to debias indirectly.263 But if incentives can crowd out invidious 
motivations such as bias, I have hypothesized that they may prove to be an 
unexpected debiasing tool. My preliminary test of this hypothesis has yielded 
unexpected contrary findings with respect to racial bias.264 But research in this area 
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is young, and further study is needed to evaluate this claim as applied to a range of 
potential motivations. The crowding out of invidious motivations is theoretically 
appealing where incentives are used to promote choices that affect third parties (e.g., 
pay-for-performance arrangements, incentives for hiring employees).265  
C. Predictability 
High levels of intrinsic motivation may at times be undesirable.266 Agents with 
high intrinsic motivation may be idiosyncratic and difficult to predict, which has 
been suggested as a particular problem for guiding agents in the workplace.267 Once 
incentives are high enough, the disciplining or relative price effect of incentives can 
override any absolute reductions in intrinsic motivation.268 This increase in the 
predictability of agent behavior may be desirable in some contexts. 
The surveillance and administration of incentives schemes also require metrics 
for assessment. That is, incentive programs create more complete contracts between 
principals and agents, which “promise uniformity, fairness, and objectivity.”269
These clearer expectations may benefit agents as well as principals, and the uniform 
administration of incentive programs can promote equality goals. Although not all 
incentive schemes are highly specific—and although transparent metrics may 
inadvertently encourage gaming behaviors in some contexts270—incentives may do 
much to promote measurable and predictable outcomes.271  
D. Increased Principal Confidence and Investment in Agents 
When motivational crowding-out increases the predictability of agents’ behavior, 
it may also increase principals’ comfort in working with agents. For example, one 
economic study found that when principals knew they could punish agents at a high 
cost for misbehavior, thereby displacing intrinsic motivations with an incentive-
based strategy, they were comfortable investing more, which generated gains in 
efficiency.272 The increase in principal investment may be a net benefit for agents, 
even when motivational crowding-out has some detrimental effects. 
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E. Marginal Benefits of Incentives 
Another unexpected benefit of motivational crowding-out may be an increase in 
the marginal benefit of agents’ actions. Hwang and Bowles have pointed out that 
when crowding-out depresses agent activity, as in when incentives lower agents’ 
level of contribution to a public good, each contribution by an individual agent 
accounts for a larger share of the total.273 Thus, even though the incentive is 
marginally less effective due to crowding-out, the benefits it does purchase are a 
comparatively larger slice of agent activity. When this dynamic occurs, it may 
sometimes be most efficient for a sophisticated planner to maintain or even increase 
the incentive when crowding-out occurs.274  
F. Efficacy of Future Incentives 
Theories of endogenous preference adaptation suggest that we can develop a taste 
or intrinsic preference for incentives. This has been expressed as concern about 
spillovers, whereby motivation to undertake other unincentivized activities 
decreases. But interestingly, spillovers may make future incentives, or incentives in 
other domains, more potent if they represent preference changes in favor of extrinsic 
rewards. For example, once you incentivize a town to accept a waste facility, perhaps 
their new preference for incentives will allow more leeway to incentivize the 
construction of a power plant or a freeway. Over time, this may arouse concern on 
the basis of autonomy and the attitudinal or moral impacts of incentive schemes, but 
from a pure efficiency perspective, it may be beneficial for the achievement of future 
behavioral goals. 
G. The Informational Value of Incentive Failures 
Motivational crowding-out is not the only concern about incentives; many have 
argued that they distract from the underlying causes of suboptimal behavior and low 
motivation. But when incentives backfire, they refocus attention on the underlying 
context that made intrinsic motivation inadequate in the first place. Focusing on 
financial incentives alone may cause us to neglect the nonfinancial motivations that 
shape behavior.275 For example, the failure of the Spare the Air program in San 
Francisco prompted an investigation to explain why commuters took more car trips 
on smoggy days when public transit was free; 276 this revealed that free transit days 
produced large increases in the numbers of people using public transit for shopping 
and leisure purposes, causing commuters to flee both public transit (to avoid crowded 
trips) and walking or cycling (to avoid the well-publicized smog that triggered the 
free transit day).277 The failure of this incentive plan identified two important reasons 
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why commuters may avoid alternatives to car travel, presenting both the need and 
the opportunity to address these issues.278
IV. INCENTIVE ARCHITECTURE AND A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERVENTION
The prior Parts have described evidence for motivational crowding-out and its 
relevance to law, the mechanisms by which motivational crowding-out occurs, and 
its downstream harms with respect to autonomy, behavioral outcomes, and attitudinal 
outcomes. A key lesson from the empirical evidence on crowding-out is its 
heterogeneity: the extent to which crowding-out effects are problematic, and the 
remedy for these problems, will depend on the context and the mechanism by which 
crowding-out occurs. To date, legal scholars have tended to treat motivational 
crowding-out as uniformly detrimental, raising the fear that crowding-out will 
undermine law and policy initiatives across a range of domains. At times, these fears 
have prompted lawmakers to make incentives entirely unavailable, as with 
compensation for organ donation, or they have led to arguments against the design 
of public and private incentive arrangements, as with the design of executive 
compensation, workplace wellness programs, or the offer of compensation for siting 
noxious facilities. The precautionary principle—bar incentives that may displace 
other motivations—is alive and well here. As of yet, however, there has been no 
effort to delineate when crowding-out effects should prompt a legal remedy or 
modification of an incentive scheme, and when they should not. No scholar has yet 
clarified what forms of incentives should arouse our concern, on what basis, and what 
downstream crowding-out effects we should redress.  
In this Part, I offer a new taxonomy of incentive schemes that will identify 
scenarios where crowding-out effects should demand the attention of legislators and 
regulators, and on what grounds intervention may be needed, including the protection 
of autonomy and concern for behavioral effects. I argue that incentives fall into 
definable categories based on the identity of the principal, the identity of the agent, 
and the beneficiary of the agent’s activity, and each category raises a different 
combination of autonomy- and outcome-related concerns. These categories can help 
us to decide when and how to redesign incentive programs in light of crowding-out 
effects. In describing this taxonomy, I will discuss ways which motivational 
crowding-out can produce negative externalities for third-party beneficiaries of 
agents’ behavior. Finally, I will discuss options for modifying public and private 
incentive schemes to intervene in crowding-out effects where they threaten behavior 
or autonomy. I argue that these changes to incentive architecture can and should be 
tailored to the specific mechanisms by which crowding-out occurs, as well as the 
specific crowding-out outcome that is of concern. 
Before embarking on ways to classify and intervene in incentive schemes, I note 
that motivational crowding-out effects should be of concern only when the agent may 
be an individual person, not where the agent is a corporate person or firm. As Galle 
has noted, “business[es] and other organizations do not have preferences as such”279
that are analogous to the intrinsic motivations of individuals; we would expect (and 
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indeed, our laws require) a corporation to behave as a homo economicus, acting 
always and only out of self-interest (i.e., the interest of the shareholders).280 Some 
incentives are open to both individual persons and firms, such as patent rights, and 
these should be considered vulnerable to crowding-out effects to the extent they 
intend to encourage individual behavior.  
Second, I note that although this taxonomy can identify programs of concern on 
the basis of motivational crowding-out, it may only be possible to remedy these 
effects where the principal is the government (e.g., penalties for tax evasion), where 
the principal is subject to regulation on some basis (e.g., a firm), or where the 
incentivized activity is itself subject to oversight (e.g., incentives for donating blood). 
It is of little use, for example, to advocate restrictions on the ability of parents to 
incentivize their children to do household chores, even if there are negative 
externalities or concerns about children’s autonomy to consent to an incentive 
scheme.  
A. Incentive Architecture Failures 
Before identifying opportunities for intervention in motivational crowding-out 
effects, it is first necessary to understand why incentive architects, both 
governmental and nongovernmental, have not already produced optimal incentive 
schemes. If incentives crowd out motivation in a way that is counterproductive, why 
have public and private incentivizers not already discarded them or, alternatively, 
tweaked them in such a way to maximize effectiveness?  
First, it may be difficult for principals to resist using extrinsic incentives to 
motivate agent behavior. Incentives are an appealing solution for those who are 
uncomfortable or unable to control behavior through request, command, or force. 
This may be due particularly to “extrinsic incentive bias,” by which we believe that 
others act primarily in their own self-interest and in response to external incentives 
and constraints, regardless of what we may think of our own motivations. 281 Several 
legal scholars have noted, for example, that when we view the actions of people who 
are subject to legal penalties, we attribute their good behavior to a desire to avoid 
penalties, rather than any intrinsic motivation.282 Participants in a study of incentives 
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for whistleblowing reported that they would personally respond best to rewards along 
with a reporting duty, while they reported that others would simply respond best 
when rewards were high.283 In another study where individuals assigned to be 
principals had the option to impose fines for shirking, a large majority (between sixty 
and eighty percent depending on the sample) chose to do so,284 despite the fact that 
the highest surplus arose in conditions where the principal had the opportunity to 
impose fines, but did not do so.285 Several studies also suggest that principals do not 
anticipate the crowding-out effect of incentives.286 The detrimental effects of 
negative incentives (penalties) may be more obvious than the potential for rewards 
to impair motivation; for example, in the workplace, although many managers may 
seek to avoid a climate of coercion, they are often less likely to recognize potentially 
detrimental effects of incentive schemes.287  
Second, imposing incentives may be inefficient but still beneficial to a principal. 
This is the case, for example, when an incentive is high enough such that the relative 
price effect overwhelms the impact of motivational crowding-out. Crowding-out 
may diminish the desired effect of an incentive scheme, but incentives may 
nonetheless net better behavior.288 Another instance may be where the incentive may 
result in a lower total surplus, but may yield the principal a larger proportion of the 
gains.289 For example, one economic game study suggested that although incentive 
contracts that allowed fines for shirking led to a smaller surplus, principals preferred 
to use them because they were able to obtain a larger share of the small surplus.290 If
they are high enough, fines for bad behavior may benefit the principal through 
reduced wages or income from fines. In some cases, incentives may simply save 
principals short-term time and resources, even if they may be damaging in the long-
term; incentives may indeed be less burdensome than other strategies for improving 
performance.291  
Third, the previous Part noted that incentives pose outcome and autonomy 
concerns. Although we might expect principals to correct the perverse effects of 
incentives that threaten their interest, it may be unrealistic to expect the market to 
value and correct for incursions on autonomy or negative externalities. These failures 
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justify both regulatory efforts and the need to enumerate options for incentive 
redesign. 
Finally, incentives may be used due to path dependency—when incentives are 
already ubiquitous or longstanding, their removal may not regenerate intrinsic 
motivation.292 Moreover, in settings where morale is low or intrinsic motivation is 
waning due to fatigue, raising incentives may simply be “easier than regenerating 
social or moral commitment once this is lost.”293 As described above, these may be 
scenarios in which nongovernmental principals may actively seek regulation of their 
incentive options, or where both governmental and nongovernmental principals may 
need to explore alternate mechanisms for influencing agent culture. 
B. Against the Precautionary Principle in Regulating Incentive Schemes 
As a preliminary point, I emphasize that we should intervene in incentive 
programs only when there is empirical evidence of reduced autonomy, inefficiency, 
or harm due to motivational crowding-out, and where that harm outweighs any 
benefits that crowding-out may confer. That is, I would reject the precautionary 
principle, which stands in this context for a decision to regulate in the face of 
uncertainty. The research on motivational crowding-out clarifies that this 
phenomenon is context-specific and may vary across individual agents, behaviors, 
and time. Many incentives may have beneficial impacts,294 and incentive schemes 
are often intended to benefit society’s most marginalized communities. For example, 
government-operated incentive programs for preventive healthcare have been linked 
to health improvements in disenfranchised communities,295 sentence reductions for 
drug rehabilitation may indeed increase uptake,296 taxes on alcohol consumption may 
reduce alcohol-related morbidity and mortality,297 and a preliminary evaluation of 
New York City’s conditional cash transfer program for poverty reduction has 
indicated beneficial impacts on education and employment.298 Barring or modifying 
an incentive scheme based on anticipated harms, without soliciting evidence and 
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weighing the adverse effects against program benefits, may be counterproductive and 
wasteful, and it may thwart promising efforts to reduce social disparities.299  
Furthermore, the precautionary principle reflects the belief that an uncertain 
phenomenon is more likely to cause harm than benefit. To date, few scholars—and 
none in the law—have considered potential benefits of crowding-out. I have here 
offered several novel advantages of crowding-out, which may offset the harms 
traditionally attributed to this phenomenon. These advantages are in need of further 
study, but if these theories hold true, it would be inappropriate to proscribe incentives 
on the suspicion of crowding-out without comprehensive evaluation. Where 
crowding-out may cause harm, a more desirable first step would be to require or fund 
demonstration projects to ascertain the behavioral impacts of incentives in a given 
area, or conversely, to identify the impacts of removing incentives that are well-
established. 
C. When to Intervene: A Classification of Incentive Schemes 
In Table 1, I have classified incentive arrangements according to the identity of 
the principal (governmental, private, or the agent him- or herself) and the beneficiary 
of the agent’s activity. These beneficiaries may include the principal offering the 
incentive, the agent engaging in the behavior, or a third party outside the principal-
agent dyad. The prior Part explained three groups of motivational crowding-out 
effects, including effects on attitudes, morality, and long-term preferences; effects 
on behavior; and reduced autonomy. The first of these impacts—attitudinal and 
moral effects—is of concern for every incentive scheme, even where an individual 
agent incentivizes him- or herself. Because attitudinal outcome effects are present 
for all incentives, they are not included in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Types of Incentives and Corresponding Bases for Regulatory Intervention 
Based on Motivational Crowding-Out 
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Fines for tax 
evasion









































Third party No No No No Commitment 
contracts for 
recycling 
1. Governmental Principals 
When the principal is a governmental entity, every incentive scheme is fair game 
for regulatory intervention and redesign. Here, the legislators and regulators who set 
these incentives have two separate bases for modifying incentives based on 
motivational crowding-out concerns. First, concerns about autonomy and the 
coercive power of incentives arise whenever the principal differs from the agent, 
whether the incentive is designed as a carrot or a stick. This includes incentives 
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offered or imposed by any branch of government, which may be enacted without 
some agents’ consent. Second, in the interest of maximizing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of governmental action, it is justifiable to modify or eliminate incentive 
schemes on the basis of their outcome effects. This concern applies regardless of 
whether the beneficiary of the agent’s action is the government itself, the agent, a 
third party not privy to the incentive scheme, or any combination of the three. (The 
case of a governmental principal is perhaps special in that we could argue that no 
actions benefit the principal alone; any action benefitting the government may in fact 
be said to benefit society as a whole, including both the agent and third parties.) 
Examples of incentives with a governmental principal are innumerable, but may 
include penalties for tax evasion, grants or intellectual property rights for innovation, 
fines for nonvoting, incentive payments for governmental contractors, incentives for 
military recruitment, rebates for recycling bottles, payments for jailhouse informants, 
sentence reductions for participation in drug rehabilitation programs, and many 
more. In every case, assuming the incentive has a legitimate governmental purpose, 
the design of these schemes should be subject to oversight and modification to 
preserve citizen autonomy and maximize efficiency in behavioral effects. 
Where motivational crowding-out is suspected, the governmental principal should 
proceed by first soliciting empirical evidence of an incentive’s effect, identifying the 
mechanism of crowding-out and specific outcomes of concern, and then turn its 
attention to modifying or eliminating the incentive scheme where harms outweigh 
benefits. There may also be public policy reasons for incentivizing that overwhelm 
concerns about crowding out; for example, courts have noted the public policy 
reasons in favor of incentivizing informants for their testimony—because testifying 
can expose informants to danger and retaliation, an incentive is needed to compensate 
for this risk, and few informants would offer information without a material 
inducement.300 Even if the incentives fully crowd out altruistic reasons for testifying, 
the testimony may be worth the impact. 
2. Private Principals 
When the principal is a nongovernmental entity, there are fewer opportunities for 
modifying or eliminating incentive schemes through legal intervention. Although 
many principals and incentive schemes will be beyond the reach of legislation or 
regulatory action (e.g., incentives offered by parents to their children), some 
principals or activities are subject to regulation, allowing for some legal oversight of 
incentive arrangements (e.g., regulation of executive compensation in some 
contexts). Within regulated spaces, there are several rationales supporting 
intervention based on motivational crowding-out effects. 
Where incentives are offered in agreements between private parties capable of 
consent, freedom of contract will generally provide a rationale for noninterference. 
This is often true even when there is a power imbalance between principals and 
                                                                                                                
300. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 19 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. Va. 1998) (“To prohibit 
prosecutors from making promises in exchange for testimony works an ‘absurd’ result where 
crimes go unresolved because of worries about testimony that may be questionable, even 
though the system already has built-in safeguards concerning questionable testimony by 
interested witnesses.”).
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agents. But because the principal is different from the agent, concerns may well arise 
regarding intrusiveness and agent autonomy when incentives subject agents to undue 
inducement. Where the principal and subject matter of the incentive scheme are 
subject to regulation, autonomy concerns can support intervention to modify the 
incentive scheme, such as by improving disclosures or reducing the incentive size to 
limit undue inducement. The bar should be high, however, for intervening solely on 
autonomy grounds. The occurrence of motivational crowding-out to any extent may 
provoke autonomy concerns on the basis that the incentive scheme interferes with 
individual motivations, but intervening on the basis of autonomy alone may only be 
justifiable when the incentives induce agents to take actions that expose them to 
harm. Where the principal is beyond the reach of regulation, contract law rules 
regarding capacity, duress, misrepresentation, fraud, and unconscionability attempt 
to safeguard agent autonomy. Although these doctrines may not reach all areas of 
undue inducement or intrusive surveillance related to incentives, they provide a 
backstop to prevent the most egregious uses of incentive.  
When the principal is a nongovernmental entity and autonomy concerns are 
minimal, the extent to which undesirable behavioral outcomes should prompt 
intervention depends on the beneficiary of the agents’ action. When the principal is 
the only beneficiary of the action, such as a company that incentivizes its employees 
to work longer hours or sell more units, behavioral outcomes should not present a 
rationale for intervention. This is because if the incentive backfires due to crowding-
out effects, the principal has the capacity to modify the incentive scheme. One 
potential exception to this may be where the use of incentives has led to inefficient 
competition among principals, in which all principals would prefer to discontinue or 
modify their use of incentives, but no principal is willing to be the first mover (e.g., 
reducing incentive-based executive compensation). In these cases, principals may in 
fact seek regulation of their incentive schemes.  
When the agent is the beneficiary of the action (either the only beneficiary or a 
joint beneficiary with the principal), such as when a university offers merit 
scholarships contingent on grades, behavioral outcomes are again a slim basis for 
intervention. Once we are satisfied on the basis of agent autonomy—that is, the 
incentive scheme does not present an undue inducement—and any legal conditions 
regulating the activity itself are met, we must respect the agents’ autonomous 
decisions regarding the incentivized behavior. A potential exception to 
nonintervention may be where principals offer incentives pursuant to a governmental 
policy or demonstration grant; for example, many employers offer workplace
wellness programs that vary employees’ premiums or copays contingent on 
participation in healthy activities or health status indicators. These programs were 
previously supported by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,301
for which the implementing regulations permitted group health plans and insurers to 
vary insurance premiums by twenty percent through wellness programs.302 Now the 
Affordable Care Act permits a variance of thirty percent in group plans (increasing 
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to fifty percent with permission from the Secretary of Health and Human Services), 
and it has authorized governmental funds and demonstration projects in numerous 
states to support wellness programs in the individual market.303 In this scenario, 
although the wellness incentives are offered and accepted by private parties, agency 
administrators may seek to modify the governmental regulations that enable such 
programs if the incentives are found to cause adverse agent behaviors. 
The tricky case for intervening in incentives set by nongovernmental principals, 
however, is where the incentivized activity results in benefits or harms for third 
parties.304 Where nongovernmental principals are not subject to regulation, contract 
law doctrines such as unenforceability on the grounds of public policy may limit the 
most detrimental externalities. But where the nongovernmental principal is subject 
to regulation, and where incentive schemes result in negative externalities due to 
motivational crowding-out, regulatory intervention may be justified depending on 
the extent of harm. Although de minimis externalities may be insufficient to interfere 
with an incentive program, externalities that are extremely harmful or that affect 
many people may be a sufficient basis for action. Take, for example, the case of 
Flynn v. Holder discussed above,305 in which a private company sought to incentivize 
individual blood marrow donors. This activity unequivocally benefits third parties: 
the recipients of blood marrow transplants. Because the activity of blood marrow 
donation is subject to oversight by the Department of Health and Human Services, 
this incentive scheme drew scrutiny on the basis of potential crowding-out effects as 
well as their downstream consequences, such as changed identity of donors and 
reduced quality of donations.306 Similarly, the case of pay-for-performance for 
physicians compensated by private insurance may also be of interest to the 
Department of Health and Human Services if it reduces patient care quality or leads 
physicians to abandon patients who depress their performance ratings. Or consider, 
for example, carbon offset programs; if individuals who purchase carbon offsets 
escalate their environmentally hazardous activities due to motivational crowding-out 
effects, the behavioral impacts of carbon offset programs may produce negative 
externalities for third parties or society as a whole (e.g., more pollution). In some 
circumstances, a private party may incentivize a governmental agent, such as 
political campaign contributions in exchange for advocacy by an elected 
representatives; motivational crowding-out effects of these incentives will 
necessarily impact third parties. Freedom of contract notwithstanding, such programs 
                                                                                                                
303. See Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Workplace Wellness Programs,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 30, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/05/29/implementing 
-health-reform-workplace-wellness-programs [https://perma.cc/JH5L-Z3XE].  
304. Crowding may in fact be less likely in this scenario because the incentive may not 
trigger the mechanism of signaling the principal’s selfishness or perception of the agent’s 
trustworthiness. Bowles notes that “[i]ncentives imposed by peers who do not stand to benefit 
personally do not compromise social preferences and are often synergistic with them.” 
Bowles, supra note 53, at 1608. 
305. 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012). 
306. See Brief of Appellants at 36, Flynn v. Holder, 684 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-
55643), 2010 WL 5854339.  
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may draw the interest of regulators if their adverse effects result in substantial 
economic harm.  
Regulators may also seek to scrutinize or modify incentive regimes when 
taxpayers are financially liable for incentive failures. For example, Roberta Romano 
and colleagues have noted that in the era of institutions that are “too big to fail,” 
including banks, rational CEOs may subject banks to disproportionate risk.307 In this 
context, the impacts of performance executives that influence CEOs’ activities at 
these institutions may be of keen interest to regulators.308  
My analysis demands a justification of who qualifies as a third-party beneficiary. 
When the principal is a firm with shareholders, it can be a close call of whether to 
classify those shareholders as third parties for the purpose of intervening in an 
incentive with adverse crowding-out effects. I am inclined to believe that they are, 
but that additional regulation to protect shareholders when incentives lead to 
crowding-out may be largely unnecessary due to existing fiduciary duties.309 A
separate question is whether third parties include future agents and principals. For 
example, consider the cases of systemic crowding-out of intrinsic motivation in the 
legal and medical professions described by Schwartz and Sharpe,310 or Walton’s 
description of the effects of incentive pay in the financial sector.311 Future lawyers, 
doctors, bankers, and their bosses may indeed experience negative outcomes due to 
these cultural shifts (e.g., agent selection effects, inefficient competition, reduced 
effort, and reduced quality of performance), which they had no part in creating. These 
effects alone should not qualify as negative externalities that demand legal 
intervention to modify the use of financial incentives. Unlike third parties to the 
incentive scheme, future agents and principals retain the ability to refuse or modify 
incentive arrangements. Of course, individual agents in these professions do have an 
impact on the health and well-being of third parties such as their clients, patients, and 
investors. But where third-party effects are not present, remedial actions may be 
better left to collective action by agents, professional societies, and market activity. 
As discussed above, I would also reject intervention based on the precautionary 
principle when incentives are offered by private parties. Intervention should require 
empirical evidence of reduced autonomy or negative externalities, because the 
selected remedy should depend on the mechanism of crowding out and the specific 
harms of concern. 
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3. Agents as Principals 
When the principal is also the agent, there is little justification for regulatory 
involvement. These incentive arrangements are variously known as deposit 
contracts,312 commitment contracts, precommitment devices, and now, “StickK 
contracts” when they are created through the StickK.com website.313 In these 
arrangements, an individual places his or her own money at risk, then keeps or 
recovers it contingent on achieving a behavioral goal, such as weight loss, smoking 
cessation, career achievement, or engagement in charitable activities. Such programs 
are often effective. Consider an evaluation of a smokers’ fund, which offered 
smokers a savings account; after six months of deposits, participants who had quit 
smoking recovered their deposits, while those who had not quit lost their funds to a 
charity donation. 314 Those who used the savings accounts were more likely to have 
quit smoking by the six-month mark, compared to those who had not used the 
account, and the difference endured after another six months.315  
Ian Ayres has provided many examples of commitment contracts and 
“maintenance contracts”—long-term commitments under which an individual agrees 
to forfeit funds if he or she does not sustain the desired behavior (e.g., keeping weight 
off or abstaining from smoking).316 As a paradigmatic example, Ayres and colleagues 
have developed stickK.com: a website on which private individuals can publicly 
announce their behavioral commitments and time horizon, announce the financial 
stakes of failure (designating an amount of money, the beneficiary, and providing 
means of payment for the withdrawal), and name a third party to police their efforts. 
If a stickK participant does not fulfill his or her goals, the website fulfills the agreed-
upon financial penalty.317 A search of commitments on the stickK website reveals 
many behaviors intended to benefit agents themselves, including weight loss, 
exercise, reduced discretionary spending, learning a language, or smoking 
cessation.318 But some agents commit to do activities that benefit third parties, such 
as volunteering at local charities, doing good deeds, calling elderly relatives, or 
maintaining social relationships.  
When the agent and the principal are the same, there is no justification for 
intervention on autonomy grounds. Many researchers cite the example of Ulysses 
binding himself to the mast to avoid being tempted by the Sirens; like Ulysses, agents 
who incentivize themselves are making autonomous choices. The ex ante agent 
signing the commitment contract may indeed limit the autonomy of the ex post agent 
(who wishes to smoke, to be sedentary, to renege on volunteering plans, or to listen 
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to the Sirens)—there is a reason why Ayres refers to high-stakes commitments as 
“disabling.”319 But the ex ante agent chooses to exert this control, and respect for 
individual choices demands that we stay out. Similarly, the law may not restrict 
commitment contracts on the basis of their outcome effects for the agent. Let’s say 
that everyone who signed a StickK contract for weight loss actually gained fifty 
pounds due to motivational crowding-out. At the most extreme, we may wish to 
require the StickK service to make disclosures to people contemplating weight loss 
agreements.320 This, however, is an objection based on autonomy concerns—if 
people still choose to sign contracts committing their future activity, there is no legal 
basis for restricting them. Most commitment contracts, moreover, would be outside 
the remit of regulation; even if an individual signed a commitment contract, for 
example, to reward herself for engaging in criminal activity, penalties would likely 
apply only to her criminal behaviors, rather than to her self-commitment.  
In the most unlikely case, commitment contracts may have detrimental effects for 
third parties due to motivational crowding-out. For example, consider a commitment 
contract to volunteer at an animal shelter. Although an individual may keep her 
promise while the commitment is in force, motivational crowd-out may depress her 
intrinsic interest in volunteering with animals: she may cease volunteering when the 
commitment ends (compared to a counterfactual scenario in which she had never 
signed the contract); she may seek out easier tasks that lessen her contribution to the 
shelter; or she may experience a spillover effect that also reduces her long-term 
interest in assisting animals or volunteering anywhere without a financial 
arrangement (including, for instance, in environmental cleanups or soup kitchens).321
These behavioral impacts may well lead to negative externalities for third parties in
the form of reduced quantity and quality of her volunteering effort. Currently, the 
use of commitment contracts may be so rare as to make these effects negligible. But 
even if such externalities are large, they nonetheless provide little basis for 
intervention. It would be impossible to police the variety of commitment contracts, 
as crowding-out effects in this context do not infringe the rights of third parties, and 
respect for autonomy would trump efforts to interfere with individuals’ financial self-
dealing. 
One caveat applies here. In some cases, agents may appear to be self-incentivizing 
(risking their own finances), but their participation in a commitment scheme may be 
required by a separate principal. Such incentive programs may be politically 
unpopular because they expose agents to financial risk, and on a large scale they may 
be difficult to tailor for a population that includes both poor and wealthy 
individuals.322 But where these arrangements exist, I would consider them in the 
previous category of incentives where principals and agents differ. 
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D. Regulating Incentive-Based Policies 
Thus far, this Article has been most concerned with the normative bases for 
intervening when an incentive plans lead to crowding-out harms. But this leaves the 
question of what constitutes an appropriate regulatory response. Although there is 
not space here for an exhaustive accounting, I offer several potential responses. 
When the harms attributed to crowding-out are sufficiently severe as to support 
intervention, a range of incentive architecture options are available. 
Most bluntly, incentive programs can be discontinued or barred altogether by 
statute, such as NOTA’s ban on compensating organ donors. Less restrictive 
alternatives, however, may be preferable, given that financial incentives often do 
succeed in shaping beneficial behavior. I have elsewhere considered a range of 
incentive architecture options that may mute or interrupt crowding-out processes.323
These may include including agents in incentive design; decentralizing the 
implementation of incentive-based programs; considering the comparative 
advantages of fines versus rewards versus mandates; choosing in-kind rather than 
financial incentives; decreasing incentive size; making incentives less salient or 
dependent on a wider range of agent behaviors; allowing agents to choose from a 
menu of incentives or donate incentives to other recipients; packaging incentive 
programs with messages that signal favorable views of agent ability or social norms; 
and using publicity strategically in addition to (or perhaps in lieu of) penalties and 
rewards.324 Research on these different options is needed, and the design and 
oversight of incentives will vary across fields. But these options may provide some 
leeway for preserving the benefits of incentive-based rules and programs, even when 
some crowding-out occurs. Rather than proscribing incentives, regulatory 
interventions based on motivational crowding-out could redesign incentive programs 
in some of these ways (for governmental principals) or set contours for the use of 
incentive policies adopted by private principals. 
Of course, sometimes incentive programs should be left alone. The effects of 
motivational crowding-out may be minimal; incentives that cause motivational 
crowding-out may nonetheless work, and they may even be preferable to alternative 
strategies for shaping behavior. Crowding-out may also have benefits, as I have 
suggested above, and any decision to reshape or intervene in incentive-based policies 
or programs will necessarily be complex. 
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed several aims. I began with the first synthesis of 
motivational crowding-out claims made throughout different areas of the law, 
including judicial decisions, legislative history, regulatory guidance, and legal 
scholars that have invoked crowding-out concerns in a range of areas. This survey 
provides the first look at dialogue on crowding-out, which suggests widespread 
application but little sustained theoretical engagement. I then incorporated 
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scholarship from economics and psychology to canvass the heterogeneous 
consequences of crowding-out, specifically considering the complex harms that have 
been attributed to the erosion of intrinsic motivation. This is a counterpart and sequel 
to my prior scholarship on the heterogeneous causes of crowding-out dynamics.325
This systematic overview of crowding-out effects can help to identify which effects 
may matter in a given setting and to inform the design of incentive-based rules that 
seek to minimize crowding-out harms.  
I have also aimed here to identify potential benefits of crowding-out, which have 
been overlooked in legal scholarship. In Part III, I offer several unique arguments in 
this field—namely, that incentives may helpfully restrict socially harmful 
motivations (e.g., interpersonal bias), that incentives may increase principal 
investment in agents, that crowding-out may increase the efficacy of future 
incentives, and that incentive failures have informational benefits. I also introduce 
several ideas that have not yet been applied to motivational crowding-out in legal 
scholarship, including motivation conservation, an increase in marginal benefit of 
agent activity, and increased agent predictability. These proposed benefits require 
evaluation. But if true, they would counsel against the proscription of incentives that 
cause crowding-out—unless the harms of crowding-out clearly outweigh its potential 
benefits. 
The final goal of this Article was to offer a principled basis for deciding when and 
why motivational crowding-out should prompt the regulation or redesign incentive-
based policies. Legal efforts to discard or limit incentive-based policies on the 
grounds of motivational crowding-out may only be normatively defensible in a few 
circumstances. Intervention to protect agent autonomy may be justified when the 
principal is a governmental entity or when the principal is a nongovernmental entity 
subject to regulation. Intervention to avoid adverse behavioral outcomes may be 
defensible when the principal is a governmental entity or when the principal is a 
nongovernmental entity and the incentive leads to adverse effects for third parties. 
Intervening in incentive plans is not justified on either autonomy or outcome grounds 
when the agent incentivizes him- or herself, even when crowding-out produces 
negative externalities. I have also argued against the precautionary principle for 
regulation in this context, and for less restrictive alternatives to proscribing 
incentives entirely. 
Much of law can be parsed in terms of carrots and sticks. This includes not only 
entire legal regimes such as tax and tort, but also specific rules that allow, encourage, 
or deploy specific incentives to change people’s behavior. The fear that incentives 
will weaken or erode valuable motivations is now pervasive in legal scholarship, and 
these concerns are often confused, imprecise, incomplete, and inattentive to 
alternative options for incentive design. I have here sought to challenge the uniformly 
negative view of motivational crowding-out and to offer some structure for 
productive engagement with crowding-out effects in law and policy. Incentive-based 
rules can and should be useful tools for shaping behavior, and wise incentive 
architecture choices can help maximize these benefits when money and morals are a 
volatile mix. 
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